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ABSTRACT
The thesis examines the relationship between the Norwegian state and the
international oil companies from 1965 when the first oil concessions were
granted on the Norwegian Continental Shelf to the beginning of 1975. It singles
out three variables which were the objects of bargaining between the state and
the companies during this period; oil-rent, volume control and Norwegian share
of spinoffs from oil. To study in more detail the division of oil-rent over
time we  have constructed a cash-flow  model  which incorporates different parti-
cipation schemes which were negotiated between the state and the companies and
which also takes account of different exploration success rates. This framework
of analysis makes use of a historical methodology. It attempts to recreate what
the likely division of rent would have been at the time when new concessions
were granted to the companies in 1965, 1969, 1973, 1974. It is only based on what
the state and the companies expected the costs, revenues and tax conditions to
be that it is possible to understand the historical development of Norway's oil
policies. We have also carried out a number of sensitivity tests to see how
changes in the variables which influence costs and revenues would have affected
the division of rent and the Internal Rate of Return  ( IRR) of the companies.
The most important of these factors was the shape of the production profile.
To understand the development  of the  three chosen bargaining variables over
time, and in particular ' the constantly increasing role of the Norwegian state
with respect to all three variables, we have relied on three explanatory factors.
First exogenous changes in the expected Present Value from the oilfields in the
North Sea; secondly the situation in the international oil industry; and thirdly
the special characteristics of the Norwegian state. While development of the first
two factors opened up the way for a strengthening of the role of the Norwegian
state in the industry and made them easier to achieve, the particular form and
manner in  which these changes were grasped by Norwegian policy-makers can only
be understood with reference to the historical and political peculiarities of
the Norwegian state, in particular the weakness of the national Norwegian capital-
ist class. Norwegian oil policies also operated within a set of ultimate policy
constraints, This meant that the Norwegian policies tried to increase the state's
share of the total rent by a process of participation and by the creation of a
state oil corporation, Statoil, which did not imply any fundamental confrontation
with the private  companies  and which left the IRR of these virtually intact.
There are thus no 'unicausal' explanations of the increase in the role of the
Norwegian state .in the oil industry. Any satisfactory explanation must rely on an
interdisciplinary perspective, No purely economic, sociological or political
approach to state intervention in a modern society is possible.
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1INTRODUCTION
The period 1965 to 1974 saw a number of fundamental changes in
Norwegian oil policies .  From being exclusively a 'passive '  tax collector
when the search for oil first started, the Norwegian state was by 1975
extensively involved as a potential producer of oil through its own state
oil corporation and was also rapidly expanding its downstream activities.
This thesis will concentrate on the reasons ,  limitations, and
perspectives for this increased importance of the Norwegian state in the
oil industry and puts particular emphasis on what this has meant for the
state ' s relationship to the international oil companies.
In order to analyse the changing role of the Norwegian state it is
necessary to develop a general framework of analysis of the oil industry.
Oil production is characterized by the existence of oil-rents. These
rents are then divided between the landlord .owning the oil-producing
territory  ( the nation - state )  and the capitalist extracting the oil
(normally a private oil company ).  Therefore an important part of the
analysis of the role of the state is (by necessity )  made by examining
the relationship between oil companies and producer - states, the two
protagonists in the battle for the oil - rents.
. The second antagonistic relationship between the companies and the
state, the control over the volume of production ,  is related to the first
area of conflict .  A change in the optimum production schedule for a
field will  ( in a number of well - defined circumstances )  change the
discounted value of the oil-rent accruing to each protagonist.
Fir-ally ,  the producer - state will want to maximize the spinoff effects
from oil. Because this aim may involve less of a direct conflict with
the companies , i t is of a somewhat different nature than the two others.
We will examine  the 1965-74 period, analyzing the relationship
between the Norwegian state and the companies ,  and the increasing import-
ance  of the Norwegian state in the light of the three variables listed
above.
In doing so, the thesis breaks new ground in several ways. It
develops ,  for the first time ,' a model to describe the division of oil-
rents which incorporates the concept of 'participation '.  In addition,
the underlying cash flow model also incorporates a number of more
specific novel features .  It incorporates a notion of 'risk '.  It also
measures  the rent in discounted terms; while a number of models have
done the same , we try for the first time to trace the development of
2discounted variables over time. Finally, our model uses an historical
methodology. This means that the development of the relationship between
the Norwegian state and the companies at any one time is seen in relation
to what was known and believed to be the case at that time. I.e. the
1969 round of negotiations between the Norwegian state and the oil
companies can only be understood in relationship to the cost and revenue
conditions and the situation in the international oil industry in 1969.
We have thus tried to recreate a number of bargaining situations
throughout the 1965 to 1974 period.
It should be noted that there is at the moment no satisfactory
treatment of Norwegian oil policies which in a systematic manner analyses
the state's overall relationship with the companies through time; or which
tries to relate the outcome of the relationship between the Norwegian
state and the companies to existing bargaining theories in the oil
industry.1
What exists is mostly partial accounts dealing with the impact of
oil on the political system (Naustdalslid (1974) (1975a,b), Noreng
(1974) (1978), Ausland (1978), Mathiesen (1976), Wyller (1973) (1975)
and Owe (1974). Similarly, there exist a number of more narrowly
defined economic studies: Eckbo (1976), Bjerkdal (1975), Dam (1976)
(1965) (1975), of which Dam is the most illuminating. But because
Dam's whole approach is methodologically completely different from ours
(see Chapter 2, p.65), and the others are very narrowly 'economic' in
their approach ,  none of these treatments are in our view comprehensive
or satisfactory . Finally, there exist  a number of Government white papers
and studies  which both deal with the structural  consequences  of oil and
outline the relationship to the companies. While these white papers are
..
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leave out the more contentious issues from their analysis. An overall
feature of all these efforts is furthermore that none of them concentrates
in a comprehensive way on the increased importance of the Norwegian state.
Based on this state of the literature, our efforts to provide an
overall and systematic investigation into the relationship between the
Norwegian state and the companies, and in particular to analyze the
increased importance of the Norwegian state in this process, can be
classified as a step forward. Furthermore ,  most case studies of company/
state relationships have been related  to third  world countries, while
Norway will be the first industrialized capitalist country where the oil
export industry will become of primary importance. Thus our analysis
3will help to broaden the scope of the study of the oil industry and make
available material for possible future cross-country studies.
Orthodox economic theory in general ,  and oil-economics in particular,
has been notoriously weak in analyzing the state and the basic motives
for state intervention .  This thesis attempts to integrate an analysis
of the state into a basically economic framework ,  concentrating on the
division of oil-rent ,  in the tradition of political economy. It is
impossible to understand the origins of state action by the Norwegian
state in a purely restricted  ' economic '  sense. Also oil is not like any
other commodity due to its strategic characteristics  ( see Chapter 8),
which tends to influence state action when dealing with the oil industry.
In order to understand state involvement  in the oil industry  a thorough
analysis of the relevant historical and political peculiarities of the
Norwegian state is provided.
The basic conclusion of this thesis will be that no single existing
theory is able to account for the increase in the Norwegian state's stake
in the oil industry .  Any understanding of what happened must rely on a
complex set of economic and political factors where the nature of the
Norwegian state becomes of paramount importance .  The thesis must in
short be  ' interdisciplinary ',  a methodological approach which has perhaps
been most strongly advocated by Myrdal when he argues:
"The isolation of one part of social reality by demarcating it
as 'economic '  is logically not feasible .  In reality, there are
no 'economic ', ' sociological ',  or 'psychological '  problems, but
just problems ,  and they are all complex ....  Logically ,  the only
distinction that is scientifically valid is the one between more
relevant factors and less relevant ones 112
This attitude led Myrdal to argue for a return to a historical and
institutional  mode of analysis .3 A similar methodology has recently
been  advocated  in a Norwegian  context by Hernes.4
Such a methodological approach stands in contrast to the positivist
approach  of most  studies .in economics which present a 'hypothesis', and
which  then a number  of observations  are meant  to falsify . We are more
interested in establishing the dynamics of state action over time, a field
of study which theoretically has largely been ignored by modern Western
economists  of the neo-classical school.
The thesis is organised in the following way: Chapter 1 describes
the historical setting within which the bargaining between the Norwegian
state and the companies first took place. Special attention is given to
4the peculiar nature of the Norwegian state ,  and the situation of the oil
industry in the mid 1960s .  When read together with Appendix A the latter
description also provides a historical overview of the state / company
relationship in the industry this century. Chapter 2 discusses in depth
the three main objectives of bargaining between the Norwegian state and
the companies ,  the choice of which are intimately related to the analysis
carried out in Chapter 1. The second part of this chapter examines the
literature which deals with the relative bargaining strength of the state
and the companies in a raw - material producing industry like oil. It is
then supplemented by our own discussion of the factors which influence
the relative bargaining strength between the Norwegian state and the
companies over time. The final part of Chapter 2 outlines the different
policy options open to the state.
Chapter 3 opens with an operationalisation of our bargaining
variables .  Then follows a detailed description of a computer cash flow
model we have constructed to evaluate the division of rent between the
companies and the Norwegian state over time. It also highlights the
special features of our approach in analysing the problem at hand.
Chapters 4 to 7 are a step-by-step analysis of what happened to
Norwegian policies between 1965 and 1974. Each chapter deals with
the-granting of a new round of concessions on the Norwegian Continental
Shelf  ( 1965 ,  1969, 1973 and 1974 ),  and we analyse what the new
conditions of exploration  ( both with respect to taxes and participation
agreements )  would have meant for the division of rent; for control
over the volume of production ;  and for the spinoff effects of the oil
production .  Parallel to this we examine the form in which the steadily
increasing importance of the Norwegian state made itself felt; and in
particular how the creation of the Norwegian state oil corporation
Statoil influenced the variables under scrutiny .  Chapter 8 then carries
out an overview of the period as a whole and relates the development of
the sharing of rent, of volume control, and of spinoff effects, to the
development of the factors that in Chapter 2 were postulated to influence
this outcome .  In explaining the nature of the Norwegian state ' s inter-
vention in the oil industry we put particular emphasis on the constraints
under which Norwegian policies were de facto forced to operate .  Then in
Chapter 9 follow the conclusions and some further perspectives that
arise from the emergence of a strong and dominant state capitalist sector
in the Norwegian economy in the wake of the oil activities.
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6CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORICAL SETTING: The oil industr and the Norwe ian
state
1.1 INTRODUCTION (1962-65)
It is commonly assumed  that the interest in the  North Sea as a
possible  oil-producing  area started  with the 1959 gas find  in Groningen,
Holland, of one  of the  biggest natural gas  fields in the world. But
interest  had already  been  shown  at an  earlier date by the major oil
companies . According to Shell: " Interest  in the  North Sea as a prospective
zone of  exploration  became marked in  the late 1950s  after the first Suez
crisis  of•1956-57.111 The initial  interest therefore stemmed from a
political  event  ( a threatened  supply boycott),  and the Groningen find
merely reinforced this  existing interest . Shell  made contact  with the
UK government  about  exploration as early as  19592 and by 1962  three of
the majors (BP, Shell and Esso )  were conducting seismic surveys off the
UK East Coast .3 Phillips was the first firm to approach  the Norwegian
government about oil exploration  in the  North Sea . The initial  contacts
were established by the somewhat unusual route of officials at the
Norwegian Embassy in Bonn .4 In the  words of one  Phillips ' executive:
"At this time  ( 1962  - PN) the primary  interest .was centred in
the southern  part of the  North Sea .  However, it was in this
initial period  that Phillips  exploration people, in evaluating
the entire area, became curious as-to the possibilities of
the northern portion of  the North  Sea.... It was thought
that this  Northern  part could  also be attractive and that
the competition for acreage might be less than in the
shallower southern  part,  where there was a more general
knowledge  of the  geology and where operations would be
closer to shore."5
If Phillips  was the first company  to apply for  acreage, others
were not far  behind.  Between autumn  1962 and June 1963 at
least six foreign oil companies made provisional enquiries
about the possibility  of obtaining search concessions in the North
Sea.6 By July 1963  the Norwegian government had given permission to
three groups to carry out surveys. The first consisted of Shell, Esso
and BP, the second of two French state entities, BRP and RAP, and the
third was 'Phillips on its own. At the same time ten companies decided
7to jointly finance an airborne magnetometer study over 144,000 square
miles of the North Sea.7
Phillips '  application for exploring and producing oil was rejected
in 1962 ,  according to one Norwegian civil servant, because "at that time
there were no regulations ,  neither in Decree nor in Law form ,  concerning
how Norway should behave with regard to such applications". 8 One reason
for this lack of regulations was that there had never been any hope of
finding oil on the Norwegian mainland .  The first necessary step for
Norway to produce oil was to declare its sovereignty over the North Sea
Continental Shelf as regards exploration for and exploitation of natural
resources .  This was done in a Royal-Decree of 31 May 1963 .  The Decree
was followed by an Act on 21 June 1963, which stated that the rights to
submarine - natural resources were vested in the State .9  Norway could
then ,  if it wished ,  grant Norwegian or foreign corporations the right
to explore such underwater resources .  The Act finally empowered the
State to issue rules and regulations concerning such exploration. A
special Continental Shelf Commission was subsequently created to work
out these regulations. While the more legal questions were being
studied in detail ,  the companies were allowed to start seismic work
on the Shelf.
Several factors should be noted about the way Norway solved
the initial legal problems connected with oil exploration.
Norway could ,  first, have ratified the Geneva Continental Shelf
Convention drawn up in 1958 to assert individual countries '  sovereignty
over the Continental Shelf. But Norway chose its own solution,because "on
one interpretation  ( of the Geneva Convention - PN) Norway would not
be entitled to any significant share of the open sea". 10 Norway's
refusal to accept the Geneva Convention, but its insistence on the
median-line principle ,  was later confirmed in a legal agreement with
the UK signed in April 1965 .  One of the reasons for this not obvious
but extremely important outcome, was the UK interest in a speedy
solution. Any attempt  by the UK  to challenge the Norwegian interpreta-
tion in an international court would have taken many years to settle,
if the normal speed of such  cases  is anything to go by. And the UK
was in a greater hurry to extract oil from the North Sea than was
Norway. All of Norway's present oil and gas-fields are today situated
in what would have been disputed waters had Britain persevered against
the Norwegian interpretation. -
8Secondly, the clarification of formal. ownership of the Continental
Shelf was thought by the Norwegian government to be a prerequisite
for an all-out involvement by the companies in the North Sea.
It is however doubtful whether such a clarification  was an  absolute
requirement for the entry of the companies (even though it
undoubtedly helped).11 And even in the Norwegian  case a number of oil
companies were  prepared  to spend a considerable amount of money on
seismic  surveys even before the  legal questions  had been definitely
settled. It  can, however ,  be argued  that these  companies  may simply
have wanted  to establish their'presence on the Shelf  as a fait accompli
before Norway had time to impose any strict regulations .  On the other
hand the major companies  did not like the prospect  of a 'free for all'.
According  to one executive  this would  lead to  'anarchy'  as well as
encourage  ' parasites ' - i.e. competitors that would idly stand by
while one  company drilled, merely to start exploring  once a find had
been made. 12
By claiming  sovereignty over the Continental  Shelf, a number of
questions were however  left unanswered.  Some of these may have meant
relatively little in 1963, but they could in the  long run have a
profound influence on future developments .  The most important was the
ambiguity of the definition  of the Continental Shelf and  whether this
should be  interpreted according to a fixed depth criterion  (200 m) or
whether the  criterion  should be  one of technological  possibility of
exploration . 13 This had  an important bearing on the question of
exploration  north of the 62nd parallel.  No acreage  was initially offered
in this territory,  because the median line  criterion of division could
not be applied,  and because there was no unambiguous  definition of the
Continental Shelf. 14
The general  situation in the North Sea in 1963  was summed up in
these words:
"Nearly 20 companies  are competing  for a glittering prize -
the chance of an oil and  gas bonanza  right on the doorstep
of the world's second biggest  consuming area."15
The companies' access to the Norwegian Continental Shelf was
formalized in a Decree form on 15 May 1964, and 8 groups could formally
apply for permission to explore for oil (but not to drill or produce).
BP split off from Shell and applied as a single group, while Gulf for
the first time became interested. Norwegian interests were represented
by one fully owned Norwegian consortium16 and through Hydro at that
9time, the second largest industrial firm in Norway, and with a minority
government share. Hydro had in February formed PetroNord together with
the two French state oil companies. This was hardly surprising seeing
that 30% of Hydro's shares were French-owned.
The detailed regulations for drilling and production on the
Norwegian Continental Shelf were published in a Royal Decree of 9 April
1965 - regulations which were to be the basis of Norwegian oil policies
until 1972. Applications for the production licences were closed on
15 June. The results were announced in September 1965. Norway had
truly entered the oil age.
It is our aim to understand the relationship between the Norwegian
state and the international companies which was formally initiated at the
same  time. As a first step towards such a task, we must analyse the
historical situation of the two protagonists in the battle for oil-rent
from the Norwegian Continental Shelf, the international oil companies and
the Norwegian state.
1.2 THE HISTORICAL SETTINn
1.2.1 The international oil industr
There were s-veral reasons why the companies should have been
extremely interested in the North Sea. Even if there was an excess supply
of oil in the mid 1960s, the demand for oil on a world-wide  scale was
expected to increase, and it was clear that  an increasing  proportion of
this  demand  would have to be satisfied from offshore areas. The five years
up to 1964 had seen an increase in world oil consumption of no less than
64.5%17 - and there was no indication that the rate of growth in demand
for oil would abate.
According to one optimistic oil executive:
"Energy demand is expected to double by 1985, and the petroleum
industry is intensifying its search for oil and gas in underwater
areas ... (therefore) ... there appear to be very few coastal areas
any place in the world which will not be explored in some manner
or other within the next 10 years."18
The prediction that an increasing amount of this oil would come from
off-shore areas was based on the worldwide distribution of sedimentary
rocks, a great proportion of which are situated offshore. 19 The oil
10
industry was in 1964 already involved offshore in 19 different countries,
while actual production was taking place in five. But these were
scattered in such different areas as the Persian Gulf and the Cook
Inlet, Alaska. In the latter area the general weather conditions were
just as bad as in the North Sea. even if the depth of water was shallower.
This general interest in finding oil must also be seen in relation
to the companies' world-wide strategies. It is here useful to distinguish
between different kinds of firms.
The independents were at the time especially eager to gain access to
new sources of oil outside the US .  When seen against this background,
the very aggressive and enterprising attitude of the  ' independent'
Phillips in the North Sea from the early 1960s becomes much more
understandable.
The majors were equally interested  in the North Sea, but partly
for other  reasons. Their  short-run  requirements  would'be satisfied
from their  own deposits ,  especially  in the Middle  East, even if we
should make a distinction between crude - long and crude - short majors..
But they also knew that  they needed  access to new fields in the medium
to long run , and that the  North Sea was one of the more attractive
future areas  which they  did not want other companies such as the
independents and the state oil corporations to monopolize . Finally,
as Gaskell observes ,  there almost seems to be a psychological law
among companies that nobody wants to be left out of a new productive
20
area.
In addition to the more general factors explaining .the companies'
need for oil , the North  Sea as a producing area enjoyed a number of
other advantages .  Oil and Gas International listed in 1964 a number
of these. For our analysis two are especially relevant : first, a
stable political climate and second ,  closeness to markets.21
At that time transport costs constituted around 30% of the
import cost of one barrel of oil to Europe.22  This  would in the
case of finds in the North Sea be drastically reduced. The political
stability of the countries around the North Sea was at that time also
unquestioned'. 23 The oil companies were in principle willing to pay a sub-
stantial premium for operating in such a political climate, where the
danger of nationalization was minimal. The companies were therefore willing
to pay what amounted to a 'political rent' for operating in the North Sea
11
compared with other parts of the world. But it was up to the Norwegian
egotiators  to try to find out how large this  rent was . The companies
were  not likely to tell them.
The companies '  interest in the North Sea and their initial strategy
can only be understood on the background of the situation in the
international oil industry in the mid 1960s .  Norwegian policy - makers
were in 1965 faced with an oil industry which for decades had exhibited
a remarkable degree of stability .  This chapter and Appendix A show
how the world's oil industry came to be dominated by a small number of
vertically integrated oil companies which operated internationally and
which in an explicit or implicit manner were colluding with each other.
Any threats to this structure ,  whether from the entry of new firms, or
from producer - states trying to exert more control ,  had historically been
incorporated or neutralised by existing firms without much difficulty.
While we will later outline in more detail the reasons for this unusual
industrial structure ,  our historical introduction shows that the corres-
ponding traditional company/nation state relationship remained one of
extreme  ' inequality '  for much of this century .  This inequality of the
traditional concession patterns were largely the result of the colonial
circumstances , under which most of these agreements had been signed.
Towards the early 1960s this structure of the industry was coming
under some pressure as 'independents '  and state oil corporations for the
first time appeared as producers .  Both groups of companies were later to
have an.important influence in Norway.
The period 1959 to 1965 can be best understood in the light of the
decision to impose quotas on import of oil to the US. This move upset
the whole pricing and profitability structure of the industry and led
to a much more unstable market situation ,  which again had an adverse
influence on the  ' majors '  and their control. The chain of reactions was
the following .  A number of US firms wanted to produce from the low-cost
Middle-East fields so that crude could be shipped back to the US ,  refined
and sold at the generally higher prices that applied to petroleum products
in the US .  This process started as early as the mid-1950s and by 1960 a
number of these companies ,  normally called the  ' independents ', 24 had found
oil outside the US .  But because of the import - quota system the amount of
oil which each of them could ship back to the US was restricted. Any
additional output from their overseas fields therefore had to be disposed
of elsewhere. In effect, this meant selling, it to the small, but increasing
12
number of independent refiners that existed in Western Europe at the
time. But there was only one way of ensuring access to this market,
namely to undercut the price offered by the majors.
But this was still not a bad commercial proposition for the
'independents', because the majors had traditionally charged a
relatively high price for the crude it sold to these refiners.
This was to take advantage of the specific taxation rules in
the West, which induced the majors to declare most of their profit
in the upstream end of the production cycle. This strategy suffered
no set-backs as long as the majors completely dominated the supply of
crude. But when the independents offered the independent refiners
cheaper crude, there was no lack of takers. Final product-prices
fell as a consequence, and the majors had no choice but to follow suit.
But with a price of crude to the subsidiaries of the majors which
stayed constant at posted price levels, and falling product prices,
profitability was squeezed. (The saying 'only fools and subsidiaries
pay posted prices' originates from this period.)
The majors consequently wanted to bring down the posted price of
crude closer to the real market level. This was for them in any case
quite natural; as there had never been any thoughts that there should
be a difference between posted and market prices when the system was
first introduced. But in doing so they would hurt the 'fiscal take'
of the producer countries, as this 'take' was linked to posted prices.
It was somewhat ironic that cutting the posted price of crude helped
the creation of OPEC in 1960.
The first aim which OPEC pledged to carry through was to restore
the cuts in the posted price. This they did not manage to do, but on
the other hand OPEC successfully fought any further cuts in the posted
price all through the 1960s even if the difference between 'posted
price' and the 'spot price' continuously widened until discounts up
to 404/bbl were to be found in the late 1960s. The weakening of the
price of crude was further brought about by the increase of Soviet
exports to Western Europe, which by 1961 provided 7.5% of all oil
consumed by the Western European NATO countries 25 Even if the Russians
tried to undercut the majors' prices to gain access to the market,
there was no reason to analyze the Soviet move as being primarily
'political'.. The Soviet Union had historically sold oil to  Western
Europe (as an example it provided 19% of total oil imports to Western
Europe between 1930 and 1933), and felt it had a claim to part of
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the market. Also, given the production costs of oil in the Soviet Union
at this time, the Soviet economy's comparative advantage may well have
been greater for oil than for any other major commodity it could sell
in the West.
The consequence of this extra amount of cheap oil on the Western
European market was a further decline in prices, and a further instabil-
ity of the oil products market.
The import quotas also had a number of consequences in the US
itself. The effect of separating the US market from the rest of the
world and guaranteeing a higher than world average price for oil
produced in the US helped to maintain US production much higher than
it would otherwise have been (and again contributed to the general
excess supply which prevailed in the rest of the world). But it made
the US consumer pay more than necessary for oil and it also encouraged
a large percentage of all the majors' exploration expenditure to be
spent in the US.26 The discovery of the Alaskan North slope fields
in the late 1960s can be seen as a result of this policy.
There was another group of companies apart from the 'independents'
which made their entry into the industry at this time and which further
complicated the former 'orderly' picture of the industry. Their
presence was only indirectly related to the US quotas. They were
the state oil corporations of the consumer countries, of which the
Italian ENI became of particular fame 27 ENI was encouraged to grow
in response to what Italian policy-makers saw as the monopolization
of the oil industry by the Anglo-Saxon majors. Once the Italian state
realized that it was paying an artificially high price for imported
crude because it was dependent upon the majors' network and therefore
paid full posted prices for the crude, it encouraged ENI to look for
oil abroad, as well as letting it import oil from the Soviet Union.
We have seen that between the late 1950s and 1965 there was a
general weakening of the monopolistic structure of the industry as new
firms entered. But.this was not automatically the same as a correspond-
ing strengthening of the -producer-states. For example, a similar
challenge in the late 1920s did not lead to any increase in the relative
bargaining strength of the producer-states. Other factors, like the
political sophistication and consciousness of the producer states, are
therefore of great importance in explaining the developments to come.
While there was no way the producer states could have improved their
situation in the 1920s and 1930s, this was not so in the beginning of
the 1960s. The states did start to take advantage of this new
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situation ,  as.their bargaining strength was slowly improving.
This change in relative bargaining strength was expressed in a
number of new agreements that were concluded from the late 1950s
onwards .  In particular the 'joint venture '  agreements along Iranian
lines were later to be the basis for the Norwegian concession systems.
But these were initially all concluded with the newcomers to the industry,
so the attitude of the majors towards the producer - states remained, in
general, as implacable as ever. The first joint venture agreement in
the industry was entered into between INOC and ENI in 1957. In
contrast to the normal agreements of. the industry, a 'joint venture'
gave the Iranians a 50% share  of the  profits corresponding to its
50% share in the investments in addition to the normal 50% corporation
tax on ENI's earnings ,  giving a rough 75/25 division of profits in
INOC' s favour .  INOC was not to invest any money until a commercial
find had been made ,  while INOC was to be an active partner throughout
the life of the project .  A similar agreement was made between INOC and
the US independents Pan American Oil Company and Sapphire in April and
June 1958.
The Saudi Arabians made a joint - venture agreement with a
Japanese company ,  Japan Petroleum Trading company ,  which was agreed
in 1957. While Saudi participation was a mere 10%, the interesting
aspect of the agreement was that the new joint company was to be
fully integrated .  The first stumbling moves had been made towards
producer - participation in downstream activities.
Kuwait made a 20% joint - venture agreement with Shell in 1961.
This was in retrospect an important event. It was the first time one
of the majors agreed to state participation. But it remained the only
joint-venture agreement concluded with any major during the period until
1965. Another kind of agreement ,  service-contracts, which also could
give an increased say to the nation - state ,  was attempted and introduced
for the first time in 1960 by Venezuela .  In such agreements the
companies have no rights .  as legal holders of concessions ,  which are
retained solely by the state ,  but are hired as suppliers of technology
and knowhow .  All decisions concering output etc .  rest with the nation-
state .  On paper such an agreement looks extremely favourable for the
producer - states, but in order to properly assess its .economic signific-
ance one has to know the details of the payment to the companies,
especially the amounts and price of oil promised as payment ,  as well
15
as the amount of de facto control that the majors exert on the basic
decisions of production .  This agreement was advocated in Venezuela
by Romulo Betancourt ,  the leader of Accion Democratica ,  who in 1960 was
elected President on a left-wing platform that included the promise to
ationalize the oil companies .  The threatened confrontation between the
government and the companies was only defused after considerable pressure
om the US government which at that time had a paramount interest in not
further upsetting the situation in the Caribbean. (It had enough diffi-
culties with Cuba .)  The US also saw the importance of continuing the
steady flow of oil from Venezuela to the US .  The outcome of the
confrontation was that the basic relationship between the US and Venezuela
continued ,  but that Venezuela set up a state oil corporation, CVP
(Compania ` Venezuelana de Petroleo ),  and it was decided that all future
agreements were to be on the basis of 'service-contracts'. 28
Indonesia was the other country which implemented service - contracts
during this period .  An agreement was reached in 1963 with Esso, Shell
and Caltex not only with respect to new contracts but also covering
older and already existing contracts .  The division of profit between
the Indonesian government and the companies was stipulated to be 60/40.
While the companies had to renounced  their temporary property  rights. over
the concessions , they retained their rights  to all over-ground assets
used  in the production of oil.  The Indonesian state oil corporation
Pertamina was to take  over  all downstream  activities  in the Indonesian
market.
We can now summarize  the changing roles of the ojl producing states during
the period 1959..1965, developments which in the long run were. going to have profound
influences on Norwegian  oil policies. First,  a number of new agreements
were introduced ,  some of  which for the first  time  actively involved state
oil corporations of the producing countries .  However ,  these companies
were initially nothing but paper organisations. Only in exceptional
circumstances did any of the majors accept the new kinds of agreements.
It was therefore up .to the  ' independents '  and the consumer-states' oil
corporations like ENI to offer new and better conditions. Effectively
the overwhelming majority of all oil continued to be lifted by the
majors under agreements that involved neither state participation nor
service contracts.
Secondly, there were some feeble attempts to think in terms of the
wider spinoff and industrialization aims of the producer-states. This
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expressed  itself by  the producer-states '  wish to integrate downstream
as well  as by acts like trying to discriminate in favour of national
shipping  companies  in the transport of crude.29
While the period saw the creation of OPEC, the new organization
remained basically ineffective. In addition to OPEC's unsuccessful
fight against a drop in posted prices in the early 1960s, the very first
OPEC conference stated as an aim: "That members shall study and formulate
a system of ensuring the stabilization of prices by among other means,
the regulation of production".30 The only problem with this aim was
that OPEC had no way of implementing it. The producing-states had no
say over the volume of production, which was still the decision of the
companies. There was also a contradictory element in the creation of
OPEC. The stability (and high prices) in the market for oil products
was  very  much a result of the majors' marketing strategies. But inasmuch
as OPEC was created to undermine the power of the majors, to this extent
there was a contradictory element buried in the very functions of OPEC.
This dilemma was never to disappear.
But despite the emerging instability within the oil industry
referred to above, the majors remained in 1965 dominant. By relying
on their vertically integrated structures, they still controlled the
overwhelming part of the world's production of crude and continued to
earn a healthy (albeit falling) rate of profit. And there was no
indication that they were lightly accepting as a permanent feature of
their relationship to producer countries the principle of state
participation or service contracts. Only in instances where they knew
that, for political reasons, it was this or nothing (as in Indonesia
under President Sukarno), were the companies willing to enter into such
contracts. The bargaining strength of the companies as a whole was
further enhanced by the fact that where they existed, the producer states'
oil corporations were in no position to take over the running of the
oilfields. In addition, most present or future producer states, including
Norway, were as consumer countries still solidly dominated by the majors.
The situation was therefore bleak for any Norwegian policymaker who was
nurturing plans of 'getting tough' with the companies as Norway for the
first time was planning to allocate acreage in the North Sea.
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1.2.2 Norwegian eculiarities
Norway had also been acquainted with the international oil industry
in its capacity as an importing country before the first concessions
were formally awarded in 1965 .  In particular ,  the general controversy
about transfer - pricing referred to above had also affected Norway.
Because Norway was charged full prices on all crude imported by the
majors during the period ,  the Norwegian balance of payments suffered
accordingly .  It is a good indication of the lack of power of the
Norwegian state in the face of the international companies that nothing
was done to remedy this situation in the period until 1965 .  The virtual
absence of any company  ( whether in the field of refining or distribution)
to challenge the hegemony of the  ' majors '  underlined the state ' s relative
bargaining weakness .  As a result of the manipulation of transfer prices
whereby imports were invoiced at full posted prices, Seierstad31
estimated that the total accumulated loss to the Norwegian balance of
payments during the 1960s was Kr. 340 mill. The head of the Norwegian
Central Bank in 1968 pointed to.the activities of the oil companies as
the prime example of how transfer prices could be used to shift profits
out of countries with a high taxation rate.32
The transfer price controversy was the first direct indication
about the difficult situation the Norwegian state faced when it tried
to deal with some of the largest multinational firms in the world. In
the short run there was never any talk of remedying this situation by
creating a Norwegian state oil corporation .  This contrasted with the
experience in other parts of Europe .  The French had, in their tradition
of 'dirigisme ',. already in the 1920s built up a state oil sector. This
was put to the same tasks as ENI from 1958 onwards ,  especially with the
advent of de Gaulle ' s nationalism .  But any understanding of how Norway
was likely to act in the long run in dealing with the oil companies can
only be built on a more thorough understanding of the special features
of the Norwegian state .  As will be argued below, Norway at the time
was no  ' ordinary '  Western European state .  Its peculiar economic, social
and political characteristics had great influence on the formation of
Norway's oil policies .  We must therefore examine these characteristics
in detail. We must however stress from the start that there will be
no direct and mechanistic one-to-one correspondence between these
policies and the Norwegian state structure. We rather want to understand
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these characteristics established the overall direction and broader limits
rf the Norwegian policies with respect to oil.
To provide a better background to an understanding of Norwegian oil
policies we will highlight two features of the Norwegian state. We will first
describe the special characteristics of Norwegian economic policy and in part-
icular Norway's historical relationship to foreign investment. Secondly, we
will look in more detail at the political conditions in Norway. We will then
see that the Norwegian state in the post-war period acted as an active, strong
and interventionist entity, which operated within a  unusually stable and
(for Western Europe) nationalistic political environment.
The theoretical basis for our subsequent analysis is provided by a neo-
marxist/institutionalist view of the state, where the state is not a neutral
entity and instrument at hedisposal of whichever party wins a parliamentary
election, but is viewed as an institution which is intimately linked to the
capitalist mode of production and its preservation. For an outline of the
theoretical basis of such a position see the author's contribution in Nore
and Green (1977), which gives the broad framework which structures our think-
ing on the Norwegian state.33 According to this, our following description
of the special features of the Norwegian state can best be understood within
a framework which postulates that the modern. state in its actions primarily
attempts to take care of two functions. It seeks to guarantee the accumulation
of capital and in different ways tries to legitimate the existing political
structures within Norway. 34
We must strongly stress that the choice of a theory of the state cannot
only be related to some a priori and abstract notion of the role of the state.
It must also be based on the concrete  ways  that the state has intervened in
the Norwegian economy. It must in short be historical instead of simply
being deducible from some abstract theories of the state.35
The control over foreign investment is immediately relevant if we
want to understand a state°s relationship to the process of capital
accumulation. History is filled with examples of how the economic
surplus, especially of less developed countries, has been remitted
overseas rather than being reinvested in the host country, A policy
that controls foreign investment can potentially prevent such a
development, while at the same time it fulfils a number of more
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direct political functions  by trying  to take advantage of popular
nationalist sentiments.
One of the striking features of many developed industrialized
countries was the absence, until the early 1960s ,  of any explicit policy
towards direct foreign investment .  Norway in this respect has been an
extreme exception ,  as the country implemented a law as early as 1906
which sought to control foreign investment .  Of the industrialized
capitalist countries only Japan has pursued a similar policy for any
period of time . ( The fluctuating role of foreign investment in the
Norwegian economy, and the various attempts to control such investment,
is schematically set out in Appendix E.)
By the time the search for oil in the North Sea got under way there
had been'a significant shift in the Norwegian state's policies in
relation to foreign investment .  While the original concession laws of
1906 and 1917 were still in operation ,  it was becoming clear that their
effectiveness crucially depended on the way they were interpreted by the
state. And since there was a significant amount of discretion in their
interpretation ,  these laws seemed to be interpreted in ways which
favoured the companies concerned .  Nevertheless ,  Norway remained very
much a  ' special cas in Western Europe with regard to control of
foreign investme' foreign investments to be accepted  they still
had to conform  strictly  defined criteria .  The most
interesting -t of view were:
"The ill not compete with existing
No' those who mainly produce
,t 50 per cent of
ed. If the required
.ay be relaxed." 36
e policies of the Norwegian
state in Foreign capital was to be accepted
as long as n, hurt  ( a negative definition and
criterion), whip tried to achieve parity with foreign
investors whenever 1, i'his policy was undertaken to try to
control the process of L al accumulation in Norway.
The state's preoccupation in the post-war period with the conditions
of accumulation also showed itself in regional and industrial policies.
Such micro-policies were aimed at increasing the overall efficiency of
the economy, and were. particularly called for because Norway has
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historically been characterized by an extremely uneven economic develop-
ment. This has been most  clearly  expressed  in the dichotomy  between
Northern Norway and Southern Norway ,  where the South has been by far
the richer region .  This imbalance has also been reproduced , -. though
less dramatically ,  in the relation between town and country as a whole.
This situation continues today, despite attempts by the government to
pursue regional  policies  to a much greater  extent than , for example,
in Sweden .  Government  policies  can also go some way towards explaining
why Norway  has managed to maintain  a fairly decentralised  industrial
structure  ( again in contrast  to Sweden). 37
As regards  the industrial structure  itself, one noteworthy aspect
of the Norwegian  state's policies  in the post - war period was the lack
of public, ownership  as an instrument  of industrial policy. The number
of industries  taken over was small compared  with other  European countries.
As late as  the early 1970s, only 12 industrial  firms had a majority
state share.38
It seems that the Norwegian state has  historically -r elied on man-
power policies as an alternative  to other kinds  of micro-intervention
to safeguard accumulation .  The Norwegian state spent  Kr. 1.2 bill. in
1976 on different items destined to increase  the mobility  and retraining
of labour. This amounted to 2.60  of the total  state budget.39
Despite the importance  of the micro- economic policies outlined
above, it was the macro-policies  instituted  in the wake of the Second
World War  which constituted the most important way that the  Norwegian.
state intervened to maintain the process  of capital  accumulation. The
development  of national accounting and the conscious  use of the national
budget, first introduced in 1946, constituted a definite breakthrough
for the Keynesian aggregate demand approach to macro-economic planning.
While the ideas of demand -management had been aired in the inter-war
period, especially following the Kriseforliket (The Crisis Solution)
in 1935 between the .  Labour Party (DNA) and the Agrarian Party, it was
primarily after the war that such a policy was put into practice. But
even in the post - war period ,  macro - policies were accompanied by the
most stringent rationing and regulatory system that Norway had ever
experienced. This system was adopted to avoid the potentially disastrous
inflationary effects of letting the excess liquidity in the monetary
system (a result of the occupation) work its way through the economy. But
such a regulation was also necessary to raise the investment rate and
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thereby rebuild the economy after the war. Finally, but related to the
last point ,  such direct regulations were introduced to conserve scarce
foreign reserves .  The new macro - policies were put into effect at a time
when, according to Sejersted , " Norway was probably the most closely
regulated economy in Western Europe".40
It was only after 1952 ,  when  ' Lex Thagaard ' ( a number of policy
recommendations eeking to extend the  already  existing economic
regulations )  was defeated  and Norway  again became  fully integrated into
the international economic  system, that indicative  macro-economic inter-
vention in  its own right  came to dominate  the policy  scene. For Norway's
return to the international  economy , through its  emphasis on non-
discrimination and competitiveness  on the world  market, made the break-
down of the strict post -war regulations  virtually inevitable. This
return was effectively anticipated  when the Norwegian government in
exile accepted  the decisions taken at the  Bretton Woods Conference
in 1944 to work for the freest possible  international economic order in
the post-war  period.  So it was mainly a question of when Norway was
to give up its autarchic policies , not if .41
The final  illustration of the importance of state policies for
the question of accumulation is seen by examining investment - rates in
the Norwegian economy .  The importance of this example lies in the
fact that this policy  also has a clear and unambiguous relevance for
the process  of political  legitimation  in Norway.
From 1945 to 1958 ,  Norway had the highest investment rate of any
OECD country .  Gross fixed investment reached 32 %  of GDP in 1958. The
period 1967 - 71 shows Norway with an average investment rate of 28.2% of
GDP, second only to Japan with 37.8%.42 Another, and equally important,
feature of the investment situation was that a much higher percentage
of total savings in Norway originated from the government than in other
countries .  In the period 1958 - 61, government saving as a percentage
of total saving ranged between 48% and 50% . 43 Because the government's
share of total investments was much lower ,  there was therefore an
important transfer of investment funds from the government to the
private sector, which in the end controlled the allocation of such
funds.
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(ii) Political stabilit and le itimac
There is at any time a close relationship between the state's role
as guarantor of the accumulation process and its role as legitimator of
the political system .  The success of each of these roles depends
crucially on the success of the other .  Nowhere in the Norwegian case
study is this more clearly seen than in the immediate post-war period.
One of the reasons why the Norwegian population was prepared to accept
high investment rates and corresponding cuts in their immediate standard
of living in the post - war period was the high degree of legitimacy that
the Norwegian government enjoyed. Most people at the time accepted
the then Prime Minister ' s subsequent description of the situation:
" In 1945 it was clear for everyone that the 'cake '  was too small.
If living ,  standards were to rise ,  the 'cake' had to grow .  This meant
that production had to grow to lay the basis for an increasing
affluence ."44 The ' consensus '  was not, however ,  total. Sections of
the working class ,  in many cases led by the Norwegian Communist Party,
which in the 1945 elections had obtained almost 12% of the votes,
campaigned against the introduction of the semi - corporate political
institutions which accompanied these policies, and voiced their
opposition to cuts in living standards which followed the high invest-
ment rate .  These challenges to social - democratic policies were
politically defeated both with the advent of the cold war and as the
first tangible results of the policy of 'sacrifice '  were seen in the
early 1950s.
The period between the late 1940s and the EEC referendum in 1972 was
characterized by an unusual consensus in Norwegian political life.
This is well expressed in the almost total absence of strikes during the
period. The average annual number of strikes in Norway during the
period 1945 - 62 was 23, with a total loss of 136,000 working days,45
among the lowest averages in the whole world .  The reason why the
majority of the population accepted these policies and politically
supported DNA was far removed from any explanation which relies on
ideological  'blindfolding' or treachery  from leaders in the labour
movement;  two explanations often  used by the left  to 'explain' this
period. People  felt they  were getting something concrete in return
for adherence . to the policies, whether it  was a continuous increase
in their standard  of living  or regional  and industrial  policies. The
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continued economic growth in the post-war period and the Norwegian
distribution of income and wealth which remained extremely even compared
with other Western European countries were the key factors in understand-
ing the high  degree  of legitimacy enjoyed by successive Labour Party
governments. We will not in this thesis go further into the very complex
problems related to this legitimization process, and will therefore
disregard what Offe (1973) calls the 'normative' or 'legitimizing'
system,46 or what Habermas (1968) calls the 'socio-cultural system'.
But it should be pointed out that the successful post-war capital
accumulation process in Norway led to a general depoliticization.47
From now on , we will only bring the ideological/legitimizing factors into
the open when they are immediately relevant for our analysis. In the
main we will  stick to an analysis of the relationship between what
Slagstad labels the economic and the political-administrative system. 48
It is against this background that the EEC referendum in 1972
assumes a great  importance, an importance which, as we shall see, also
had repercussions on oil policies. The outcome of the referendum
represented a dramatic end of the 'consensus' period of  Norwegian
politics. The referendum, which led to a direct cooperation  between the
Labour Party and the Conservatives in favour of entry, and anunprecedented
popular mobilization against entry, shattered, at least temporarily, the
political stability of the Norwegian post-war era.
(iii) A more  eneral view
We have above briefly outlined two special historical features of
the Norwegian state which will be of use in understanding Norwegian oil
policies. It is clear that such a selective description is of limited
value unless we also understand the more general features of Norwegian
society. For reasons of space this has mainly been done in footnote
form below. We will here only schematically point to a number of crucial
structural features which suggest that Norway, at least until the early
1970s, did not conform to a standard description of an advanced country
in the imperialist centre. A number of factors suggest that Norway during
this period enjoyed a "semi-peripheral" status in the world economy:
- A large part of Norwegian exports were primary or semi-prpcessed goods.49
- The Norwegian industrial sector consisted of small and generally weak
firms. so
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Foreign investment played an important part in the Norwegian economy,
despite consistent attempts to control its influence.51
But it is not only the economic structure of Norway which in some
sense can be described as 'atypical '  within a Western European country.
The political institutions also show distinct characteristics .  Because
there tends to be a close relationship between the political and the
economic characteristics of any society ,  this is of course not
surprising. But, independently of any such economic determinism for
the characterization of 'the political ',  the political history of Norway
also reveals a number of  very  special features .  In particular the weak
position of the Norwegian bourgeoisie ,  the strong anti - centralist and
anti - bureaucratic political tradition ,  and finally a strong nationalistic
sentiment,'are all factors  which will  be important in explaining the
course of Norwegian oil policies . 52 The special position of the
Norwegian state and in particular its close relationship to the Norwegian
Labour Party is also part of this special Norwegian political
tradition. 53
1.3 TOWARDS A MODEL OF BARGAINING
The above overview indicates  that  there was a situation of mutual
dependence between the Norwegiån state and the oil companies .'  On the
one hand the Norwegian state exercised the legal sovereignty over a
geographically promising area of the Continental Shelf in the North Sea,
but thought it needed the companies to find and produce the oil. On the
other hand the companies possessed the necessary expertise to carry out
a search. They also controlled markets ,  but needed the consent of the
Norwegian state to gain access to the promising area which was outside
their own jurisdiction.
This mutual dependence .was similar to what had traditionally been
observed in the oil industry from the beginning of this century. When
in Chapter 2 we want to put forward a more formal framework of analysis
to understand the relationship , between the Norwegian state and the oil
companies ,  this must therefore partly be based on the historical
experience of company / state relationships worldwide. These have been
described above and in Appendix A. But because the Norwegian state
differed fundamentally from traditional  oil-producing  states  ( and indeed
from other Western European states ),  our framework will also  . have to take
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account of the special features of the Norwegian state highlighted above.
So when the next chapter identifies three objectives of bargaining as
rent, volume ,  and spinoffs, the choice of these is based on a combination
of general insights derived from the history of the oil industry, and
the more particular features  of the  Norwegian state.
Such a starting point is indispensable for a satisfactory historical
approach to the problem at hand .  In our view no meaningful framework of
analysis can ever be constructed in an 'historical vacuum'. One ' s choice
of key variables of analysis is inevitably influenced by one's perception
of history.
26.
CHAPTER 2
THE BARGAINING: OBJECTIVES OUTCOMES AND POLICIES
Part I: Objectives
page
27
2.1 RENT 27
2.1.1 An inquiry into the nature of monopoly rent in the
oil industry 28
2.1.11 Adelman's analysis 29
2.1.12 The political perspective 30
2.1.13 A compromise view 32
2.1.2 Definition of rent in the oil industry 36
2.2 CONTROL OVER VOLUME 38
2.2.1 The theory of depletion 41
2.3 SPINOFFS 44
Part II: The outcome of the bargaining process 45
2.4 TRADITIONAL THEORIES 45
2.4.1 Bilateral monopoly and game theory 46
2.4.2 Historicism, an alternative static model 47
2.4.21 The political dimension 51
2.4.22 Static bargaining models: summing up 52
2.4.3 A dynamic view 54
2.5 A NEW MODEL 57
2.5.1 Exogenous changes in rent 57
2.5.11 A synthesis 59
2.5.2 Peculiarities of the Norwegian state 63
2.5.3 The international context 63
2.5.4 Summary 64
Part III: The policy options 65
2.6 AUTOMATIC VS. DISCRETIONARY POLICIES 65
2.7- STATE PARTICIPATION VS. TAXATION 68
2.7.1 Effectiveness 70
2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 75
Footnotes 340
27
I
CHAPTER 2
THE BARGAINING: OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES AND POLICIES
Having completed an overview of the oil industry and looked in some
depth at the special features of the Norwegian state, it is easier to
construct a framework of analysis which examines in detail the objectives
of bargaining between producer states and the companies. This framework
which for brevity's sake we will call a 'model' is set out in Part I of
this chapter. Part II deals with the outcome of the bargaining process,
while Part III looks at the different policies that a producer-state can
implement and their effectiveness. Our model has initially been
constructed at a relatively high level of abstraction. There will
therefore be some methodological 'victims' along the road towards
clarification. We are for instance faced with at least three actors in
our analysis (the third being the Norwegian non-state industries). But
for the moment  we assume  that the Norwegian state also represents the
interests of this third actor. On the other hand, the model as it is
being presented conforms to the methodological principle of seeing how
useful a model which contains a niminum number of variables can be before
any extension is made to its basic structure. It is also important to
proceed in this way for the purpose of exposition. We will first  examine
each object of bargaining in turn and will start with rent.
Part I: Ob'ectives
2.1 RENT
The main feature of the oil industry compared with most other
industries is that it permanently gives rise to rent. The division of
this rent is then the subject of a conflict between the landlord who
owns the land where oil is produced (normally the nation-state)' and the
capitalist who exploits the oil-field (the oil company). Oil-rent
originates upstream in extraction, downstream in refining and petro-
chemical production, and retailing. While it has historically been
relatively meaningless to separate the three activities due to the
existence and dominance of the integrated firms, such a separation is
conceptually quite possible and has lately been made more meaningful due
to the loss of upstream activities by the companies and the introduction
of 'federalism' within the present-day oil industry whereby each sub-
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sidiary of a vertically integrated company ,  whether up- or downstream,
has to make a profit on its own.
Our task is to find a meaningful definition of rent that will be
useful for the analysis of the oil industry as well as being theoretic-
ally coherent .  This is no easy task. The question of rent is an
extremely vexed one .  Bye refers to the  ' anarchic conditions prevailing
in this field of study'.2
An examination of the theory of rent and its historical development
will be necessary before we can present our definition of oil-rent.
The first part of our concept of rent, differential rent, is based
on the classical theory of rent. The analysis of differential rent
from natural resources has changed little since the writings of Marx
and Ricardo .  But because the classical theorists had great difficulties
in handling rent which existed at the margin  ( labelled absolute or
monopoly rent), our attempts to deal with this aspect of rent absorbs
important elements of the Marshallian concept of rent. This is hardly
surprising, as rent theory can still be seen as a battleground between
Marshall and the classical writers .  The nature of this confrontation
and its relevance to the oil industry is set out in Appendix B.
2.1.1 An in uir into the nature of mono of rent in the oil•industr
The classical notion of absolute rent is of little use in determining
the price and therefore the amount of rent to be earned in the oil
industry ,  except when it focuses on the political element of absolute
rent  ( see Appendix B). Our alternative is to focus both on the
possible monopoly elements ,  as well as on more explicitly political
elements ,  in determining the price of oil and oil products .  This choice
follows from what we regard as a strong tendency towards monopolization
within the industry . which was described in Appendix A. We will argue
that in the very nature of oil production itself there are powerful
forces which prevent the .  normal market mechanism from operating.
Monopoly and restrictive practices therefore become the rule rather
than the exception in the industry .  Such a view is not uncontroversial.
It clashes with a very influential school of thought, most clearly
articulated by Adelman and Bradley ,  which tries to analyze the operations
of the world oil market and consequently of oil prices from a competit-
ive market - equilibrium point of view.
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We will first present Adelman's work as representative of the school
of thinking that relies on pure market analysis .  We will then present
another school of thought represented by RafaT, which argues that prices
(and hence rent )  are fundamentally politically determined. Finally,
we will put forward our own analysis.
2.1.11  Adelman's analysis
Adelman sees costs and oil prices as moving together in the long
run.3 Based on this theoretical starting point it is not surprising
that he has been the most - quoted predictor of the demise of OPEC and
the collapse of oil prices  which in 1978  is close to 50 times the price
of an incremental barrel in the Middle East.
Adelman 's theory  of price4 is complex and must be seen in relation
to the pecularities  of the oil industry.  His concept of cost has two
elements :  development costs  and discovery  cost, both of which it is
(at least in principle )  possible to determine for existing fields. The
problem arises for new discoveries because, according to Adelman, no-one
can say anything about the relationship between the amount of money spent
on exploration and the ensuing increase in recoverable reserves. There-
fore future discovery costs per barrel are unknown .  But it is possible
to postulate an u pper limit  to future  oil prices which is the price of
extraction if no further exploration should take place. If the existing
oil deposits were all to be depleted  ( and no new deposits found), then
production costs for future oil would be slowly climbing .  This is
because existing techniques and financial factors tend to 'skim the
cream '  of the wells  -  more oil can almost invariably be extracted from
existing deposits if one is willing to spend more money on the under-
taking.  ( Average recovery rates of existing fields are still only
around 30'per cent .)  Thus total world demand for oil could be satis-
fied for a long time from existing fields ,  but with a higher production
cost per barrel ..  If therefore no new fields were found we could
establish  a maximum  long-run price for one barrel of oil - what  Adelman
labels maximum economic  finding cost (MEFC). To the extent that new
and richer deposits, and better technology both in exploration and
production become available, so the long-run price of oil will fall
short of the MEFC.
If companies or governments are willing to invest  more  per barrel
in total exploration and finding costs than MEFC, this can, according
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to Adelman ,  only be due to 'imperfections '  in the system such as
governments '  wish to protect indigenous energy resources.5
Based on such a theory Adelman predicted the MEFC for 1985 (some
15 years after he wrote his major work )  to be around 20 cents per
barrel  ( real terms ). 6 This is the level towards which oil prices,
according to Adelman ,  will tend to gravitate in a perfectly competitive
world in the absence of new discoveries and technological progress in
oil extraction.
A number of questions immediately present themselves in regard to
the use of this methodological framework ,  which relies heavily on the
market for an explanation of developments in the oil industry.
The first is the obvious question of how can one then explain the
drastic actual increase in price in recent years .  Adelman's answer
would be that 'non-market' forces are to blame .  He states that the
degree of monopoly is a variable  ( apart from demand and supply) which
decides .the development of the oil prices over time. But when do the
exceptions become the rule? There is relatively little use in saying
that X is the long-run tendency if this tendency never asserts itself
in any forceful manner. It has anyway been almost impossible to talk
about the existence of a "petroleum market" for large parts of this
century ,  given that almost all oil has passed through the vertically
integrated companies.
Secondly ,  why does Adelman only analyse the MEFC in the Persian
Gulf? It may not be optimal for the Gulf states to satisfy the whole
world demand for oil because of absorption problems in their economies
even if such behaviour would be the most  ' rational' from a private
point of view. In short, Adelman seriously underestimates the absolutely
crucial political forces that may push a country towards limiting the
output of oil. (For a further discussion of this see Section 7.7).)
2.1.12 The olitical ers ective
The methodological antithesis to Adelman is represented by an
analytical tradition where we find writers like RafaT and Chalabi, and
with  some  reservations Noreng. These writers claim that the determination
of the price of oil is primarily political.
According to Chalabi a close examination of the history of the oil
industry confirms what he labels the administrative nature of oil-pricing.
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He categorically states , " Never in that history were prices set in
accordance with so-called market-forces ". 7 As an example of his way of
thinking consider the companies '  decision in the post -war period to
undertake price-cuts of Middle East oil in relation to US oil. Chalabi
sees this decision as political and not  ( as is normally claimed)
motivated by changes in market forces. The basic reason was the concern
of Western economic planners and oil companies to reduce the cost of the
oil to the developed oil-importing countries .  His article is a step-by-
step argument that similar political forces have been (and in the post-
nationalization world of today continue to be )  the prime  ' mover' in
setting the oil price.
A similar position is taken by RafaT when he writes : " crude oil
prices do hot seem to derive from an economic concept relating them to
the economics of production or from a commercial concept governed by the
dynamics of supply and demand ,  but rather from a strategic conce t that
aims to insulate rices from the continuous fluctuation and evolution of
the industry.... the only way out of  the dilemma  ( of determining oil
prices - PN) was to proceed through the strategic and olitical a roach
outlined above".8
Noreng's position is somewhat closer to our 'compromise solution'
outlined below. While he claims that different factors are important in
explaining the formation of the oil price at different stages in the
development of the oil industry ,  he states , " the oil - price has been
influenced under quite different circumstances by factors other than
marginal costs" .9  As an indication  of his  approach ,  one of several key
factors which he sees will influence the price of oil in the future is
"the political relations between  OPEC  and OECD countries ,  and their own
internal cohesion".10
Different reasons are put forward  why the  pricing process in the
oil industry is so influenced  by political  considerations. The main
reason RafaT gives for this state of affairs is that all traditional
economic market models assume that  the oil industry  is a competitive
industry,  an assumption  which "is in contradiction to the  integrated and
oligopolistic structure of the oil industry". 11
This does not preclude RafaT from advocating an understanding of
what he labels the 'technocratic' approach to the pricing of oil by which
he means an  understanding of the more limited 'economic' elements in the
pricing process. But according to the thrust of his work such an
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insight is mainly important in setting the relative prices of different
crudes (relative in relation to the 340 Arabian Light), while here we
have preoccupied ourselves with the general price level of oil.
For Chalabi the basic reason why the oil price has always been
'administrable' is because producers are limited in number and any
barrel of oil which is not produced is stored in the ground without any
cost. As a consequence the major producers can set the price of oil and
sell in as great quantities as the 'market' can take.
The main problem with the 'political' approach to oil pricing is
that it leaves the whole outcome of the pricing process 'suspended in
the air'. Literally anything can happen. As a minimum, such an analysis
has to be linked more closely to an analysis which seeks to identify the
crucial variables why there has been a high degree of concentration in
the industry. It is not enough (as Chalabi does above) to ascribe this
to the few producers in the industry. The world has seen many other
industries, especially raw material industries, where the same has been
the case, and where 'market forces' have influenced the pricing process.
2.1.13 A com romise view
(i) Barriers to  entr
r
The continued tendency towards high prices in relation to production
costs, and consequently large rents in the oil industry, during the period
under study, is in our own analysis due to a number of reasons which
cannot be adequately understood by either of the approaches outlined
above. The first element in our explanation centres on the relationship
between a highly concentrated market structure and high prices, a connec-
tion also mentioned by the FTC Report (see Appendix A, p.302). We will
start our analysis with one key element in determining market structures:
barriers to entry.
The most important of the barriers to entry in the oil industry
is the substantial need for capital required both to enter and to operate
continuously in the industry. In exploration there may be a need to
finance an unsuccessful venture over a considerable period of time. In
production, especially in areas like the North Sea, the capital require-
ments have been so vast that only a. handful of companies have been able
to raise the necessary capital on their own. While in downstream
activities the cost of building and putting on stream a refinery
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constructed to attain most economies of scale in the early 1970s were
upward of $250 million. 12
Furthermore ,  the companies often exercise a monopolistic control
over the necessary technology to produce oil, a monopoly which is partly
a reflection of the high research and development costs in the industry.
The necessity to spread production internationally so that each
company refinery has access to crude of different qualities from its
own sources in order to satisfy a particular  ' blend '  of crudes, also
tends to limit the number of potential entrants to the industry, even
if 'swap arrangements '  between firms can limit such a disadvantage.
(ii) 'Natural mono i '
0
While there is relatively little disagreement that the oil industry
is characterized by. important barriers to entry, a much more contro-
versial issue is the extent to which the industry could be said to be
a 'natural monopoly ',  which could then readily explain the existence
of rents in the industry. Since the marginal cost of production in the
oil industry is much lower than the average cost, there has been a
natural tendency towards oversupply in the industry. Historically it
has been possible to produce additional output, or in a relatively short
time find new reserves, at a price which was below the average cost. of
the existing industry .  This tendency can be attributed to heavy fixed
investment13 which has encouraged companies to push additional crude
onto the market at a price which, being in excess of the modest marginal
cost  ( and therefore contributing to a positive cash flow ),  was not high
enough to cover ,  average cost. The only way to avoid such a disastrous
development  ( for existing companies) has historically been to tightly
control supply through a monopolistic market structure.
The potential instability of the industry ,  and the ensuing struct-
ural consequences ,  can also be  formulated in a slightly different way.
As long as there are economies of scale in the production of crude,
the expansion of output can threaten the market equilibrium because
the incremental barrel can  be sold  at a price which is lower than the
going price .  Monopolization  of the industry  is again seen as a way of
preventing this from happening.
The history of the oil industry can be interpreted in the light
of the above theoretical insights .  In particular the unusually strong
tendency towards monopolization and vertical integration can be seen
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to be a result of the necessity of controlling supply. No-one has put
this point of view more coherently than Blair. While attributing some
of the concentration of the oil industry to phenomena like geographical
concentration of large reserves, and large capital requirements both
for production and marketing through vertically integrated channels,
he nevertheless continues:
"The degree of concentration inherent in the nature of things
has been insufficient o provide effective control of markets.
The nature of the industr is s h that stabilit of rice
re wires almost com lete control of the markets." 14
The way such a control historically has been maintained is then set
out by Blair.
"By means of  a web of cartel  agreements  set up in most of the
world's consuming countries, they (the majors - PN) secured
control over most of the world's markets. Through boycotts,
intimidation, and the active support of  government  bodies,
particularly the US State Department, they have been remarkably
successful in keeping. outsiders out." 15
A largely similar position was taken by Frankel when as early as in
1946 he wrote:
"Because of  the uncertain results of exploration, the high over-
head costs at all stages of the industry, and a high inelasticity
of demand in the short run, the industry is not 'self-adjusting'
in the sense that a fall in prices chokes off supply significantly
or strengthens demand. Therefore the industry is subject to
continuous crises in the absence of reasonabl stron control
over supply." 16
Finally, Stork also supports such an analysis when he states:
"Indeed, the historic dilemma of the US oil industry has been to
restrict production in order to bolster prices."17
The numerous ways that even the US governments, whether federal or state,
have intervened in the oil industry is a constant reminder of the poten -
tial problems of output control in the industry. The Texas Railroad
Commission, which today continues to administer a pro-rata system for
oil production, was set up in the wake of the collapse of the cartel
system in the US in the' early 1930s which had led toa 90 per cent drop
in the price of a barrell of oil from the newly found East Texan fields.
The 'as is' arrangement (see Appendix A, p.298) was similarly set up in
the wake of a market collapse in Europe in the late 1920s.
35
The relationship between vertical integration and monopolization
is controversial. While it is possible to argue that vertical integra-
tion is partly a product of special tax concessions that historically
made it advantageous for firms to be vertically integrated, and hence
is no way is an "inherent" feature of the industry,18 it is equally
plausible to argue that this industrial feature, which has dominated
the oil industry since the formation of Standard Oil in the last century,
is an integral and inevitable aspect of the oil industry. Frankel puts
it bluntly when he says:
"The strength of the international companies lies in the degree
of their integration.... The real power that these companies
have:1s the Power of Disposal if the international oil
companies would not provide what I like to call this 'internal
grid' somebody else would have to find a similar structure." 19 20
It should be pointed out that our view that the oil industry is a
'natural monopoly' is strongly opposed by Adelman.21
(iii) Political influence
In addition to 'barriers to entry' and 'natural monopoly', there is
a third reason why there has been a tendency towards monopolization in
the industry. The reason is related to the characteristic of oil as a
'strategic good'. The UK's purchase of the Anglo-Persian Oil Corporation
is but the clearest example of this. More recently, as long as the oil
companies were able to reliably supply at a low cost the ever-increasing
demand of the Western world for oil, there was a tendency by the
governments to tolerate the continued existence of the oil-company
cartel. The large influx of foreign earnings from the companies'
overseas operations which contributed to the balance of payments in
the mother countries22 also made the companies  more  immune to government
interference in their affairs while at the same time it gave the
companies a disproportionate political influence in their home countries.
Only one  more  task remains to be undertaken before we can put
forward our own definition of oil-rents. We have to decide whether
there are any limits to the amount of rent that can be collected at
the margin, i.e. what is the upward limit to the price of oil?
There is the immediate limit that oil must not be made uncompetitive
in relation to other sources of energy (a fact which is today keenly
appreciated by the OPEC countries). 23 While this may seem an obvious
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point, it nevertheless has important methodological repercussions, by
focusing the attention on oil not as a good in itself, but oil as one
among many sources of energy. This approach is most clearly put forward
by Masserat,.who claims that final oil prices per energy-unit to the
consumer will tend to gravitate towards the price of US coal. This is
because the production of US coal gives the average rate of profit for
the production of energy from a global point of view.
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2.1.2 Definition of rent in the oil industr
This concludes our discussion of the factors which determine the
absolute level of the price of oil, and hence oil-rents, As  key  explan-
atory factors we have chosen a combination of political variables and
the high level of monopolization in the industry. At the same time
there are clear upper limits to the price of oil determined by oil's
relation to other forms of energy .  Thus long - run trends in the price
of oil ,  like the gradual decline in the 1950s and 1960s, only .  reflected
market developments in a very slow and hesitating way. The only instance
where the market mechanism today operates  i n anywhere like a  ' normal'
manner within the oil industry is in determining the relative prices
of the 52 kinds of OPEC crudes once the reference - price of the Saudi 340
'marker' crude has been set.
The theory  of rent as it has been presented so far can give rise
to a number of definitions of rent which are appropriate with respect
to the oil industry. We will choose a definition that combines the
classical notion of differential rent with 'excess rofits' that are
being made at the may in as a result of the mono olistic features of
the industry. There are Marshallian overtones in the definition because
we claim that rent does not only originate from land.
Broadly similar definitions have been put forward by other writers.
Van Meurs refers to'rent as profit which is in excess of 'normal profits'
defined as "that profit which is just sufficient to induce the entre-
preneur to stay in the industry".25 He also allows for a notion of
quasi-rent which is somewhat different from the one employed in the
traditional Marshallian context. Included in quasi-rents are earnings
that are necessary for the continued existence of an oil company in
exploration but not in other activities. Mikesell has a slightly wider
concept of rent, as "any surplus above the current expenditures necessary
to produce the output".26
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The only difficulty with these definitions as they stand is that
they give no more specific insight into the origin of this rent in the
oil industry .  The only writer who has tried to do that in any systematic
way is Chevalier  ( 1974 )  and (1976 ).  Our own definition of rent which
will now be presented is in broad terms inspired by his writings.
Oil-rents consist of two elements, differential and monopoly rent.
(i) Differential rent  is due to the heterogeneity of different
crudes and production processes. It accrues to those who produce,
transport ,  refine and market oil in the best conditions.
Differential rent is made up of various components:
Quality  rent:
Gravity, measured in degrees API, is a characteristic of crude oil.
The lighter the oil ,  the higher price it will fetch . 27 Sulphur content
is important due to the substantial pollution to which this component in
oil can lead .  It is expensive to 'desulphurize '  crude. Normally it is
mixed with  ' non-sulphurized '  crude. But high sulphur content still
represents a negative rent differential .  28 Due to special local
donditions ,  the quality differential may be different in different
markets  ( depending upon tastes etc).
Position  rent.
Production close to major markets is obviously of importance as
there can be savings in transport costs .  Such a position rent should
in theory be possible to evaluate from the world-scale quoting and the
corresponding AFRA rate for tanker transport .  But unfortunately there
are difficulties in using these rates for our purpose .  Chevalier
supports this by stating , " Most of the oil traffic is a steady one.
A company which controls a steady traffic optimizes its fleet and the
average cost incurred does not depend on AFRA rates variation."29
A similar critical attitude is expressed by Tanzer.30
Mining rent:
This is an expression of the different production costs which reign
in different oil-fields. The average cost of extracting oil in the
Middle East is a maximum of around 30 cents per barrel compared with
a production cost close to $4 per barrel in the North Sea (1976).
Technological rent:
Technological rent is due to one firm ' s greater efficiency in
production ,  refining or marketing .  It can be due to economies of scale
in these different activities, or one firm ' s control over technology.
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The above four are all differential rents that are internal to the
oil industry. The differential rent of the last barrel of oil needed to
supply a  market is zero.
(ii) Monopoly  rent reflects the abnormal rates of profit which are
earned in the oil industry as a whole and are mainly due to monopolistic
features of the industry.
Monopoly rent results from the high concentration of the industry
which, at the level of production, is due to natural monopoly ,  vertical
integration and high barriers to entry. At the level of circulation
monopoly rent is due to collusion and restrictive practices which in
some instances are aided by government policies.31
The total amount of rent is then divided between the producer-state
and the oil corporation. Total oil-rents are therefore the sum of:
(i) taxes from oil-producing countries ,  in the form of royalties,
income taxes ,  bonuses etc;
(ii) after-tax return on capital to the oil corporation in excess of
the normal rate of profit . ( We will later return to a definition of this.)
Taxes charged by importing countries on energy  ( like sales taxes
on petrol )  are sometimes included as part of monopoly rent. Such an
extension of the definition will at the present stage not bring any
further clarification to the problem of the distribution of oil-rent
between the Norwegian state and the companies .  It will consequently be
ignored. 32
Our concept of oil-rent can as a first approximation be presented
graphically . 33 The weakness with such an approach is that the rent is
presented as undiscounted .  We will in Chapter 3 operationalise our
concept of rent in discounted terms.
2.2 CONTROL OVER VOLUME
While there is an antagonistic bargaining relationship between the
nation state and the oil companies over the relative share of oil-rent,
the bargaining between the two 'actors' also takes place with regard to
other issues. The most important of. these is control over volume of
production .  Such control affects the overall size of the PV from an
oil province and is therefore an aim which is separate from maximizing
the relative shares of the two actors.
Historically there have been at least four separate reasons
advanced as to why there should be a conflict over volume of production.
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Until recently the OPEC countries worried about control of production
because less output from any of the fields implied less revenue for the state
in question. When payment-- to the state mainly consisted of royalties, this
relationship was even more direct than when income also started to flow from
profits taxes. As one high OPEC official has said: "Most confrontations
between single countries and the international oil industry have been over
rates of production."34 The conflict was clear in its origin (and still is
for countries that don't control their own output). An oil company operated
a vast production network which meant that the only criterion for output
decision was maximization of the cash flow of the totally integrated firm,
irrespective of the wishes of the individual producer countries.
Lately the question of volume control has been posed in a slightly
different manner and also with a somewhat longer time horizon for the
producer states. It is clear that to maintain OPEC (and thus for the
producer countries to earn high amounts of future rent by charging high
prices), the cartel, by formal or informal means, needs to control the
quality of production by its members.
A third level of argument in favour of volume control has been put
forward in countries like Norway and Saudi Arabia, especially since 1973.
Their arguments are based on the assumption that there is no automatic
correspondence between the optimum private and social rates of extraction
of a natural resource .  So in order to maximize oil-rents in social terms,
there may be a case for state intervention to control the volume of.production.
(For a further discussion, see Section 2.2.1.)
The state may finally want to control output for reasons of 'conservation'.
This can mean refusal to let the companies flare gas, or (less used) forcing
them to invest in 'uneconomic' secondary and tertiary recovery methods in
order to increase the exploitable reserves of a field. Whether such an invest-
ment  is "worthwhile" clearly depends upon the different discount rates of the
state and the companies.
Control over voluem is normally classified as part of a wider government
aim of 'control' over the industry.35 This is however a very inexact and unclear
concept as it is normally presented. We first want to show that it is difficult
to separate the state's aims of 'control' and 'rent maximization'. The former
is a prerequisite for the latter, To do this we have to distinguish between
the micro- and the macro-aspect of the level of production and speed of
output. Government interference in the rate of exploration in existing
fields is different from those guiding state interference on the macro-level,
e.g. for the Norwegian North-Sea sector as a whole. Most theory addresses
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itself to the exploration of a given amount of a natural resource, in
effect the micro-case. Micro-control rearranges the private optimal
depletion path and will affect the present value of an oil-field.
(But if the same total amount of oil is extracted the undiscounted
figures will remain the same.) This is the case where the private
companies are most opposed to government policy, as such regulations
can upset their existing production plans which are carefully constructed
according to private micro-economic criteria. As noted above, control
over the physical production from one oil-field (e.g. by stretching
production from 15 to 25 years) will change the present value of that
one field. The direction of the change will however be more difficult
to ascertain if the change in production-profile stems from a change in
discount-rates. This is because two variables (the decrease in discount-
rate and the increase in the life-time of the project) pull the PV of
the field in different directions. Therefore, while regulating the
volume at the micro-level still means that the state seeks to maximize
its share of the oil-rent, the new aspect of micro-control is that the
overall size of the discounted rent will have changed in response to the
state's action.
Before we examine the theoretical underpinnings of the case for
micro-regulation, let us briefly turn to macro-regulation. Macro-
control will affect the total present value from the oil province such
as the North Sea as a whole, but will have no effect on the present value
of our individual hypothetical fields once their production goes ahead.
The total output from one oil province can be controlled by not issuing
new licences, a procedure that has been prevalent in Norway. While such
a control is perceived by the companies as much less of a threat than
micro-regulation, the companies are not uninterested in the aggregate
level of output from one region. Leaving aside the historically specific
conditions of the North Sea case (which makes the companies extremely
interested in production from the area because of the security of
supply of high quality, high profit oil in a politically stable region
close to the major markets), there are other reasons why the oil
companies will be interested in the aggregate level of output. Quantity
produced affects the economies of scale the companies can achieve in
manpower training in technologically 'new' areas and standardization
of production gear.
In the following case study we must therefore distinguish between
'micro' and 'macro.' control of volume. But once we have arrived at an
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adequate definition of 'rent', no other and new theoretical concepts
will be needed to describe the quantitative consequences of volume
control.
2.2.1 The theory of de letion
The theory of exploitation of a non-renewable resource tells us
that a profit-maximizing private owner of a natural resource will
exploit that resource at a speed that will maximize his expected present
value of the investment. The crucial future variables that the individ-
ual capitalist has to assess are costs ,  prices, and future demand. Any
assessment concerning speed of extraction will be based on private costs
and benefits as well as the private discount rate. Broadly speaking,
an expectation of a sinking real price of oil will induce a
faster rate of exploration from existing finds, as will an increase in
the private discount rate.
To determine the exact conditions for an equilibrium path of
exploration of a natural resource the best starting point is the work
of Hotelling , 36 who showed how a micro-economic market equilibrium
with respect to depletion rates could come about through the operation
of the market .  For a given reserve of a homogenous non-renewable good,
the optimum rate of depletion is established when the increase of the
profit margin from extracting oil, and therefore the increase in the
price of oil (if the margin and costs of extraction remains constant)
equals the rate of interest . This  is because the extra future income
a producer,would get from leaving the natural resource in the ground
is equal to the extra income that can be generated from extracting the
oil and investing the proceeds at the going interest rate; i.e. the
Marginal Revenue of following both courses of action is equal.
According to Hotelling there is a natural tendency towards an equilibrium
in this situation. If the rate of extraction is less than the equilibrium
rate, supply will decrease and prices will rise, encouraging a higher
level of extraction. If the rate of extraction is greater than the
equilibrium rate, the reverse will hold.37
The price of the resource will slowly tend to increase over time,
because the rent (see footnote 37) increases. But this increase is only
related to the increasing scarcity of the good and within this model has
nothing to do with rising costs of production. The key insight when we
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deal with roduction from an existing find is that "A higher rate of
discount means that T (the time-span of exploitation - PN) becomes
shorter and the initial production becomes higher ... 11 38
There are no fundamental difficulties in extending the above
framework to the case of monopoly. Hotelling shows that the standard
result that a monopoly will tend to increase prices and restrict out-
put (and hence act in a 'conservationist' manner) also holds for non-
renewable resources.39 But it should be noted that the analysis is more
complicated than the standard textbook comparison between 'perfect
competition' and 'monopoly'.40
One problem when we extend this optimal depletion theory to the
case of monopoly arises  because a  monopolist might use a higher rate of
interest with which to determine the equilibrium path of extraction and
subsequently increase the current rate of extraction compared with a
competitive 'path'. This higher rate of interest may result from the
higher rate of return that a monopolist can earn elsewhere, and thus
would tend to counteract a monopolist's tendency to restrict output.
Note that the depletion analysis as it stands has disregarded new
production, says nothing of intergenerational equity,41  assumes no un-
certainty about future  markets and  technical progress, and says nothing
about the elasticity of substitution between the resource in question
and other factors of production.42 Neither does the analysis as it
stands examine  the stability conditions of a market for raw materials.43
But all of these problems have been subject to theoretical analysis.
Based on these discussions (the details of which are found in the
footnotes above), and our previous discussion, there are at least five
reasons why the state could want to intervene in private depletion
decisions.
(i) There may be externalities in production of oil, coupled with a
situation where the individuals who suffer the consequences of these
externalities do not have any way to organise as a collective group and
thus be in a position to 'bribe' the originator of the externality to
stop his activity. (The latter is a standard condition for a private
market equilibrium with respect to externalities.)
(ii) There may be joint production from any field (as when a field
straddles a national boundary, or in the US a private boundary). In
that case one individual producer has no incentive to recognize that
'less' production today implies 'more' production in the future.
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(iii) There may exist what StrØm labels  " society ' s conservation-
motive",44 when a state attributes a positive value to have in its possession
a certain stock of a raw material .  A private rate of depletion may
exhause these stocks because its rate of discount is higher than the
social rate of discount .  In addition to the reasons already given for
such a situation ,  where structural dislocations in the economy, as a
result of oil production are of prime importance, arguments of a more
distributional character are also important.
The ones who benefit from the production of a raw material are
invariably different from those who pay the costs of extraction. In
the Norwegian case  ( during the period of study )  this difference was very
important in pushing the Norwegian state to decrease the rate of extraction.
Therefore the distribution effects between private individuals of any
particular output profile of oil should be considered . 45 Pigou's more
general point that  "...  there is wide agreement that the state should
protect the interests of the future in some degree against the effects
of our irrational discounting and of our preference for ourselves over
our descendants " 46 is also important to the argument about 'society's
conservation - motive', and if accepted would lower the social rate of
discount.
(iv) So far all our examples have implied that the state should try
to conserve existing  stocks of  raw materials. However, to the extent
that the state believes it is faced with a monopolistic situation where
the expected rate of extraction is below the market rate  ( see above),
there can be a rationale for intervention to accelerate the private
rate of production .  This may also be the case where the state, for
whatever reason, has a 'shadow price '  of oil which is higher than the
market price.47
(v) The possibility of dynamic instability in private natural
resources markets presented in connection with Stiglitz's work (see
footnote 43 above )  may also give a rationale for state control over
volume of production.
Note that our conclusions above will be modified when we analyse
production from new finds .  A lower discount rate will then make new
finds 'commercial '  and then increase production instead of decreasing it.
This theoretical discussion suggests that there are a number of
reasons why the state should regulate the volume of production, even if
some  economists48 are very sceptical as to the effectiveness and ability
of the state'to do so in the real world.
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2.3 SPINOFFS
Our historical review of the industry suggests that the producer
states, in addition to maximizing their control over the oil-rent, also
have aimed to use the oil industry to create employment and stimulate
economic activity within their national boundaries. The producer states
with in short to maximize the spinoff effects from oil. This aim was
particularly important for the Norwegian state which was actively trying
to develop its industrial base (see Section 1.2.2, (i)).
Spinoffs from oil can analytically be divided into two separate
categories .  Forward spinoffs are related to the possible uses of
crude oil in refining and petrochemical production .  In this case
maximization of spinoffs is related to the aim of maximizing oil-
rent, because of the high value added and the potential profitability
in processes like petrochemical production. Such spinoffs are not
maximized for their employment effects mainly because these industries
are extremely capital-intensive .  But in the second category of spinoffs,
backward  -  spinoffs ,  which include production of equipment to find and
extract the oil, like drilling rigs, production platforms and supply
ships ,  the wish to maximize employment constitutes an important
driving-force for state action.
Both kinds of spinoff can lay the foundation for an industrialization
process in an oil-producing country. In addition, a producer - state can
use the general oil revenues to start industrial projects totally un-
realted to either backward or forward spinoffs .  Historically a combina-
tion of low rents and corrupt ruling  classes more bent on personal gain
than on the industrialization of their countries can explain why no such
developments have taken place in the oil-producing states.49 An addi-
tional factor for this was the wish of the companies (particularly after
the Mossadeq affair )  to move their downstream activities to politically
more secure areas .  We shall however disregard the general industrial-
izing effect of the oil activity and in the Norwegian case study only
concentrate on the more specific effects which relate to both backward
and forward spinoffs.
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Part II: The outcome of the bar ainin rocess
Having established that the objectives of bargaining between the
oil companies and the Norwegian state are oil-rent ,  volume control,
and spinoffs, we want to examine which factors are likely to determine
both the outcome of this bargaining over time, as well as the form which
state intervention will take.
Within a traditional framework of analysis there are two broad
ways of explaining and understanding this development ,  neither of which
is satisfactory .  The first approach is to attempt to situate an
explanation within the confines of traditional neo-classical theories
h ,of state intervention i the economy. Our critique of this approac
fl ipo nt o,t out in Appendix v. is very important from a methodologica
because a rejection of the traditional neo-classical paradigm
regard to the understanding of the actions of the-state opens the
o an alternative theoretical framework for analysing the state's
in the oil industry.
Having rejected a traditional micro - economic  a nalysis of state
ention, we must also  show why a  second and more  specific
fling approach to the development of raw material concessions
unsatisfactory. This will briefly be done in section 2.4 of
,apter before we present our own theoretical framework in2.5,
di tional bargaining theory can deal with the question of the
O','of il-rent in two different ways: First, the analysis can be
an abstract  ( and general) theoretical model of bargaining.
ively ,  the outcome can be analysed from a 'historicist'
Ve on the assumption that once it is decided which are the
hbles that determine each actor ' s bargaining strength, each
`>'then treated as being basically different ,  so nothing in
an be predicted about the outcome. We will present and
these two approaches before we outline our own solution to
em of bargaining.
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2.4.1 Bilateral mono oly and game theory
On the assumption  that the oil industry  is monopolistic we can
examine the traditional bilateral - monopoly case of bargaining. Both
in the Norwegian and in the UK case the oil companies .  have organized
hemselves  into Offshore Operators Committees, which essentially present
united front '  to the two producer - states . 50 Unfortunately such a
general approach is of only limited value ,  because the outcome of the
argaining  process under these circumstances is theoretically indeter-
inate. All we can predict from such a theoretical framework is a range
likely outcomes ,  which in our case is no help in establishing a
rminate solution .  It is also questionable to what extent even to
.blish such a range would help our analysis, since from the outset
ow the total amount of rent at issue  ( the present value of the
id) and by a minimum of a priori historical an lysis also can establish
thin  what likely range this rent  will  be divided .  If for instance
,e is a worldwide trend towards a 50/50 split of this rent, it is
omfi ifi li rgn cant yate sunlikely that any new  agreements  would dev
division.  As Ferguson  writes  about bargaining  within this market
Bilateral monopoly as a general model of bargaining is therefore
w of economic analysis".51
ture, "The precise result is determined by factors beyond the
ittle use on its own, even if the approach may still give limited
52 It is only when thisfight into the question of 'collusion'.
roach is linked to a more historical view of bargaining that it can
more useful.
s branch of analysis has not lived up to original expectations in
'lying applied studies. Game theory has in particular difficulties
53handling non-zero sum games, it is restrictive in its behaviour
54zimptions , and in conditions of uncertainty gives rise to additional
blems unless  we also specify a risk indifference curve for the
55:ors. The approach has finally been accused of being 'non-dynamic'.
can only agree with Young:
"The game-theorists' conception of bargaining has yielded a
number of elegant models, but it abstracts away all the dynamic
On a more general  level of abstraction  one can  look for a solution
he problem of the division of rent according to game theory. But
of the concept even in the analysis of static relationships.
aspects of bargaining and severely  limits the applicability
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By contrast the economic conception of bargaining as an
interaction process involving  offers and counteroffers
permits the introduction of dynamic elements into the
analysis of bargaining.... But the models that have so
far been derived  from this  conception are heavily rest-
ricted in terms  of applicability and they exhibit a
mechanistic  quality which  stems from  the fact that they
abstract away all the manipulative activities commonly
associated with bargaining. Moreover neither of these
conceptions has yielded predictions about bargaining which
correspond at all well with the actual processes and out-
comes of bargaining in analogous real world situations." 56
all is not lost.
",.. the principal value of these models  [ of bargaining
- PN] lies'in the insights and conceptual stimulation
which they unquestionably generate rather than in the
specific predictions and explanations that can be
derived from them." 57
our own  specific  case  study, the main insight  from game -theory stems..
n the importance of interdependency and 'dynamic behaviour' in
gaining. But the main conclusion still remains that there is no
tiple game-theoretic 'answer' to our bargaining problem even if
e'particular problems listed above could be solved.
4.2 Historicism ,  an alternative static model
If we settle for an 'explanatory model' on a lower level of
abstraction as a result of the failures of any general bargaining model,
wemust consider more specifically the problem of bargaining as related
0 oil.  The most important representatives of this approach are
Hartshorn  (1967), Vernon (1967, 1973), Penrose (1968, 1971),  and Mikesell
(1970).  But the way  this approach  is presented in the literature has
the disadvantage  that only  seldom are any formal models of bargaining
5958 and Penroseexplicitly spelt out. (To the extent that Hartshorn
use any theoretical framework it is the indeterminate bilateral monopoly
case. )  Consequently ,  this approach tends to neglect the overall view
of different factors' interrelationship and the consistency of their
aims. Instead we generally find scattered references to factors that
have contributed towards the 'strength' of one or the other of the two
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actors in question, which are then used to give a solution' to the
bilateral monopoly case .  An understanding of the key in any bargaining
situation between oil companies and nation states therefore tends to
become implicit rather than explicit ,  and the approach becomes descrip-
tive rather than analytical .  But on the other hand the strength of
this half-historical ,  half-analytical approach should not be under-
estimated .  Based on an intimate knowledge and insight of the oil
industry, the practitioners of this approach identify key variables
in the bargaining game, and inasmuch as the approach is preoccupied with
historical developments ,  it can give insights to a dynamic approach to
bargaining.
We will now situate the insights of the historical approach within
our own theoretical framework outlined in Part I above, mainly in order
to facilitate their presentation, but also to show that our framework
can 'absorb' the insights of existing work in this field.
We will not analyse the strength of either of the two actors to
increase the total amount of rent. Problems such as prerequisites for
the existence of cartels like OPEC which can push up the price and thus
increase rents without a corresponding change in the share going to the
nation-state will therefore not by analysed .  At this stage we are only
interested in factors which influence the division of a i ven amount of
oil-rents.
As a first step we will analyse factors which historically have
served to maintain the monopoly power of the companies so that they
have been able to expropriate a large amount of the oil-rent. The
ability to earn monopoly rent is crucially dependent upon lack of
competition between the major companies as well as on the exclusion. of
new entrants to the industry  ( among the latter the state oil companies
which could replace the majors). We therefore have to analyse bargain-
ing strength in the light. of barriers to entry in the oil industry.
Such an approach will also further help to clarify why the oil industry
historically has exhibited a high degree of monopoly, a discussion
started .above.
Control over technology stands out as the most important barrier
to entry. This is in the last analysis the main objective basis for
a company's claim of being the only entity that can carry out the
production of oil. It is also an extremely strong bargaining card in
the hands of the companies because it is possible to view control over
technology  as being much more  'inevitable' ( and hence  politically
49
acceptable) than the control over property the companies enjoy in the
normal concession agreements.
Such a view is supported by a number of writers. A company's
bargaining position ultimately depends upon the inability of a producer
state to run the industry itself. The faster a producer state builds
up an independent oil expertise, the stronger is that state's bargaining
position. The ultimate bargining threat of any company (withdrawal or
non-entry) can therefore be undermined or shown to be a hollow claim
once the state acquires such expertise.60 It is therefore hardly
surprising that at the highest level of abstraction, Vernon identifies
a nation state's bargaining strength as being inversely proportional to
the scale and the technological complexity of the investment in question.61
Penrose similarly describes the existence of technological requirements
of investments in the oil industry as being one of the crucial factors
as to why oil companies historically have earned a rate of return that
is higher than the average.62 The dynamics of negotiations between the
companies and the producer-states can, as a first approximation, be seen
as the battle between one actor's control over technology, and the
other's attempts to catch up in this field.
Even if the nation-state is capable of running the oil exploration
itself, it willstill get the company to undertake the task if it thinks
that the return of this line of action outweighs the possible costs
(in whatever form) of acting on its own accord. Such an assessment
from the state's point of view therefore represents a kind of crude
'cost-benefit' analysis. In deciding whether to grant a concession
or not, the state weighs up on the one hand, how badly it needs the
oil, and on the other how much it thinks it can get out of the oil
company. 63 According to this line of thought, the nation-state will
go ahead with a concession if the former outweighs the latter. 64 But
the nation-state may, for instance, not want to commit all its scarce
resources (both skilled labour and capital) to investments in one
industry. If this attitude is strong enough the state may simply refuse
to commit any state capital to what it regards as a risky project,
especially if the state is a risk-averter. We consequently at one
point will have to inquire more closely into the future producer-state's
attitude to risk.
A third reason why one of the 'actors' may be in a superior
bargaining situation is its potential access to finance. The importance
of this point is related to the cost of the investment. The larger the
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cost, the more important such access becomes. It should be noted that
the World Bank up until 1973 refused to finance oil exploration in
third world countries, its reason being that finance was already
available from the major companies.65
A fourth factor that historically has contributed towards the
barriers to entry into the industry was the companies' control over
marketing outlets, a control which is intimately related to the
tendency towards vertical integration in the industry discussed above.
Vernon 66 concludes that the companies '  control over marketing  ( together
with their superior access to capital )  have been  the key  reasons for
the superior bargaining position of the companies ,  a factor also
emphasised by Penrose. 67
Fifthly the international situation in the oil industry at any
one time will also influence the bargaining relationship between any
particular company and state. It constitutes the constraints within
which everything on the more particular level must operate. In
Appendix A we saw how the relationship between companies and producer-
states on several occasions changed in response to developments on the
macro oil level. The spread of the Venezuela 50/50 principle is only
one of many examples. Such a process works mainly through a mechanism
whereby a specific oil company's demand for acreage will be influenced
by the world situation of demand and supply for oil and other forms of
energy. Whether the nation-state is dealing with a crude-short-or a
crude-long company also influences the bargaining strength of the
company in the same way as the number of alternative sources of supply
they control. Lack of diversified sources has at various times had
serious effects for oil companies, the most important example being
Occidental's confrontation with Libya in 1970 (see Chapter 7).
The final factor which affects the bargaining is a producer-state's
economic situation; in particular its overall energy requirements, its
balance of payments position, and its need to gain additional revenues.
But even the relative strength of these factors must be related to the
international situation of the oil industry. A producer-state will
always tend to look at the terms obtained by other producer-states
before it sets its own terms of exploration.68
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We have so far highlighted a number of specific factors that in
the view of the historical approach have influenced the division of
rent between a nation-state and an oil company .  But there is one
factor which has an effect on all the above-mentioned factors and which
can be seen as a 'common denominator' in the bargaining game. This is
access to information .  In particular ,  the initial bargaining between
the two actors very often takes place when the state is nearly 'blind-
folded '  with respect to information .  The companies tend to be in
possession of all information concerning geological structures,
expected market developments ,  costs etc ,  and can choose which facts
to present to the nation - state. To what extent this information gap
closes as time goes by will help to determine the long-run division of
rent between the two  ' actors'.
Apart from the more 'objective'  reasons already  outlined,  a number
of writers have emphasized  'political'  factors in determining the
division of rent between the companies  and the producer- states.
Appendix A strongly suggests that the history of the industry abounds
with instances where political influences and pressures rather than
any objective comparative advantage have given a company access to oil-
producing fields .  This was particularly and blatantly so in the pre-
1945 era. Tanzer considers the strong position that the companies
historically have enjoyed primarily to be a reflection of the political
support that companies have received from their home governments, 69 as
well as from the political allies that companies invariably have man-
aged to build up within the producer - states themselves .  Evensen, while
not being so general , clearly interprets the early part of the history
of the industry as a reflection of inter-imperialist rivalries. 70 But
the position of the companies has also recently been defended by general
political back-ups within the  ' mother - countries '  in the form of general
legal provisions like the US Hickenlooper Amendment. This was intended
to discourage any third world country from taking steps which interfered
with US business interests abroad . However, too close an identifica-
tion between companies and the ruling class within individual countries
(or indeed. with individual governments) may have unacceptable long-
run political consequences for the companies. This is particularly the
case in the event of a fundamental political change where the companies'
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close cooperation  with  an 'old' regime  may seriously  prejudice their
credibility  and hence  the possibility  of working within any 'new'
order. The role of Gulf Oil in Angola represents a recent example.
It is therefore  only  in exceptional circumstances that the oil
companies  explicitly  will challenge the existing political order (as
in Iran 1953 ).  On the whole it is in their interests to maintain a
'low profile ',  and continuously to stress their 'comparative advantages'
from a technical and marketing  point of view.  To 'corner '  a government
by making belligerent noises and by threatening blackmail can be counter-
productive ,  especially if it leads to an over - reaction by the government
in question.
There exists an extensive literature covering this more explicit
'political '  aspect of  the oil industry ( see especially O'Connor (1955,
1963 ),  Stork  (1975),  Tanzer  ( 1969, 1974 ),  Sampson  (1975).  Because of
their historical  specificity,  little purpose will be served by examining
each case study in detail. It suffices to note that political pressure
from the 'mother-countries '  of the major companies is a factor which
any concrete analysis will have to take into account .  But separating
the 'political '  element in the bargaining process71 is not totally
satisfactory ,  because there are strong interrelationships between the
political and technical aspects of a country ' s bargaining strength.
For instance, the decision  to build up  national expertise to run the
oil industry is basically a political decision with technological con-
sequences .  Such a political decision may have been taken for no other
reason than a deep-seated feeling that foreign corporations should be
kept out of certain industries at all costs .  Alternatively, such a
'political approach ' may spur the  nation-state  simply to buy the
services of certain companies for a fixed fee (a  trend which  started
with the service contracts of the 1960s). This is a way for the
nation-state both to play off different companies against one another
.and also to ensure that its political interests  ( often of a distinctly
nationalist character )  are protected through its retention of full
legal sovereignty over a producing area.
2.4..22  Static bar aining models :  summin u
We .have now used our conceptual framework to classify factors which
according to the 'historical school' at any moment in time have influenced
the bargaining strength of our two actors .  In addition to purely
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political  elements , these include factors which, in one way or another,
influence the actors '  monopoly situation ,  such as the overall world
situation in oil; control over technology ;  access to capital and down-
stream activities ;  and access to information .  In addition the individual
company' s position may depend upon whether it is crude-short or crude-
long ,  as well as on the number of alternative sources of production
upon which it can draw.
Within this framework ,  the companies' bargaining strength is
nothing but a mirror-image of the strength of the nation - state which
they happen to confront .  In other words ,  their strength is mainly a
,flection of how badly the state in question needs the oil (or the oil
evenues), This  depends upon the balance of payments situation, the
nternal -political situation ,  and the country ' s overall energy situation.
The problem with such a static approach is not that it is wrong
per se. On the contrary, it is useful in identifying the importance
of specific factors such as technology, which influence the bargaining
relationship .  It is rather that this approach does not go far enough
in its analysis and seems mainly to consist of a fairly arbitrary list
of factors which affect one actor ' s 'strength '.  Apart from this general
tendency towards a methodological 'looseness ',  there are also a number
of more specific objections with respect to the'historical '  approach.
First .,  the 'weight '  of each of these factors is not known.
Unless such an evaluation is made ,  this approach cannot say anything
about developments of bargaining strength over time .  Neither can it say
anything about the exact 'weight '  of one factor on the bargaining position
at any moment of time.
Secondly ,  if we are interested in how bargaining strength changes
over time, such a list of factors is. of limited use since it provides us
with a comparative static rather than a dynamic approach to the problem.
Thirdly, such an approach tends to obscure the fact that one of the
main decisions  a producer-state must  make  is how fast it wants oil
extracted. This decision almost inevitably leads to a choice  between
letting a major international company undertake the production, or
choosing a state oil corporation to undertake the task.
Fourthly, the approach does not discuss the problem of limits to
state actions, because it  assumes  that there  are no  such limits. This
(implicit) assumption is especially apparent in the discussion of the
'cost-benefit' analysis (cf. p.49). This can lead to quite unrealistic
and thoroughly ahistorical predictions that a producer-state may
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nationalize  the oil industry (even without  compensation) if only the
perceived costs are less than the perceived revenues .  Without going
into any detail about the process of nationalizations in raw-material
industries,72 in our view it is clear that such a decision is in no way
the outcome of a rational assessment on behalf of society as a whole,73
but instead is intimately related to the different class-forces that
re brought to bear on the state at any particular period of time.
our alternative approach will try to link different kinds of state action
o these internal class forces and in this way attempt to establish what
units exist  for state  action in  the industry.
Finally, and possibly most importantly, there is little systematic
iscussion by those adopting the historical approach about what form
tate involvement in the industry will take. There is in particular no
equate framework  for analysing  the emergence  of state oil  corporations
`y linking such a discussion to the fourth point discussed above.
Orthodox bargaining theory within the context of oil and raw
aerials has only tried seriously to deal with one of these objections:
the lack of dynamic perspective represented by a simple listing of
,factors influencing bargaining strength. Indeed it is possible to argue
that the main insight to be found in the literature concerning the
process of bargaining in the oil industry has been related to such
dynamic aspects of the bargaining process. Although there is no complete
theory which can be applied, the writings of several authors provide
enough material to give a broad indication in which direction to focus
our analysis. In this area our task will be to synthesize and extend
already existing insights.
The most illuminating contribution  comes  from Mikesell.74 He
claims that companies must initially be given an inducement to enter a
'virgin' area by being offered a rate of return which is higher than
the 'average' rate of return. This is partly because the 'risk' is
perceived to be higher, but also because the nation - state is in a
relatively weak bargaining position in the initial period . ( After all,
the decision that an international company and not a state oil corpora-
tion i s given  the exploration right, is normally an indication of the
inability or unwillingness of the nation - state  to carry  out this task
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itself.)  Once oil  is struck  and substantial  profits start  to be made,
the 'pre-strike'  claim to resources  will be questioned; the state-
will feel cheated ,  given the  normally  generous conditions that originally
were given to the companies . ( If no oil is found, however ,  the state
quickly forgets  about the expenses that the companies have gone to in
order to carry out such a project .) There will  therefore  inevitably
be pressures towards a renegotiation of existing contracts ,  something
which is also clearly brought  out by Smith  and Wells .75 The claims by
the government and the companies  for the oil- rent exhibit what Mikesell
calls  ' a dynamic  logic'. If the  dice were originally loaded in favour
of the companies when they committed large amounts of fixed investment,
then subsequently the relative strengths of the two actors change.
"Thus some few years after investments have been made, the pressure to
increase the government ' s share will grow - and be met by the company." 76
Vernon also talks about this pressure towards a renegotiation once
production is under way , 77 and lists  three factors that may bring about
such a change: First, a national realization of the dependency on,
and vulnerability to, outside forces brought about by the foreign
investment; secondly ,  changing national policy objectives ; thirdly,
the need for increased total revenues on behalf of the government.
Even if this suffices as a first  ' check-list ',  it says little
about the underlying forces, which is perhaps most clearly visible in
relation to the third factor .  78 However, come the day when the company
has to take a decision on whether to reinvest profits in  the initial
venture, or to extend its existing operations  in the  country, the
balance of forces is again weighted in favour of the company. The
original state must compete with  all other  possible areas for the invest-
ment .  Again in the words of Mikesell: 'Me moment of a new investment
is the moment of. greatest bargaining strength for the company." 79
The most important precondition for an outcome to follow the
above description of the "dynamic  path" is that the  nation-state does
not itself become capable  of efficiently carrying  out the tasks of oil
production , i.e. that the  companies manage to maintain their techno-
logical monopoly . This may not be  the case  if Vernon  is right and there
is a long - run tendency towards an erosion of technological supremacy 80
This means that the technological competitive edge that the companies
originally held and to which they partly owe their  strong  initial bargaining
position, will break down as the host country's knowledge of the  .oil--industry
steadily  increases and as the learning  period for  using advanced  technology
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decreases. Only a continuous technological development, so that a
nation-state is continuously trying to catch up with yesterday's
technology, can prevent such a trend from manifesting itself. Mikesell
does not, however, rule out a joint maximizing strategy by the two actors
in such a situation. This can only be dealt with by open or tacit
recognition by both of certain 'rules of the game'; the most important
consequence of which is that the size of the 'pie' is not reduced by
what he labels "the scramble over the portions".81 But it then becomes
important which 'pie' to consider; the static one with no new investment,
or one that assumes continuous development of resources. Both the proper
inducement to offer the company and the joint maximization strategy will
differ in each instance. Therefore in the broadest sense Penrose
characterizes the bargaining situation as a continuous assessment by
both actors as to the costs of 'giving in' to the bargaining opponent
compared with the cost of resisting his demands.82
We have so far developed a dynamic view of bargaining that to a large
extent has relied on generalisations based on concrete case studies.
It is in response to the shortcomings of such a mode of analysis that
Chevalier has developed his own more general model to deal with the
general trends in the oil industry . 83 But unfortunately there are also
serious problems associated with his work,8. so it follows that we will
have to rely on our own framework of analysis to understand the
Norwegian case study.
We have now examined, both from a theoretical and historical
perspective, the existing dynamic models which can be used to analyse
the bargaining relationship between the companies and the producer-
states. These models differ dramatically with respect. to both the
level of generality and how well they are worked out. And while they
give a general indication in which direction to continue the search for
clarification, for each question these models answer, a new question
emerges. For instance, what form will the increased government 'tough-
ness' take? Are there any limits to this process? How do the different
factors interact? Will the renegotiation be retroactive or will it
only relate to new agreements? So even if especially Mikesell's work
can yield important insights which will will make use of when we
develop our own approach to the dynamics of bargaining, these models can
only be viewed as a starting point of an applied analysis. We must also
remember that almost all thinking about company/state relationships has
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been carried out with reference to third world countries. This has
inevitably influenced the traditional way of thinking about the issues.
Analysing a relatively sophisticated industrial country like Norway
will impose its own 'demands' on our thinking, especially with respect
to defining the behaviour of a nation-state.
2.5 A NEW MODEL
Our approach to bargaining argues that there are three main factors
which will influence the outcome and form of bargaining over time: first,
the change in total expected rent from an oil provice; secondly, the
international context, and thirdly, the particular nature of the nation-
state involved in this confrontation.
We will analyse each factor in turn.
2.5.1 Exogenous changes in rent
Within a dynamic bargaining model, inspired by Mikesell, we predict
that an expected increase in rent from an oil province will lead to a
response from the state in the form of pressure for changed conditions
of production. This constitutes our first influence on the bargaining
outcome. The increased expected rent can arise if there are exogenous
changes in the operating conditions, for example an increase in the
price of oil and/or a change in the technological conditions under which
oil is produced.85 Alternatively, the total expected amount of rent from
a field will increase if the success rate of finding new fields increases
or if a field is found under more favourable conditions, with better quality
oil and/or in larger quantities (if there are economies of scale) than
originally anticipated. Either way we would expect the producer-state's
terms to harden. There is nothing particularly 'radical' or 'socialist'
in such a 'tightening'. It is rather that any producer-state which does
not follow such a course can be described as basically incompetent,
although it is generally the case that left-wing governments on the
whole tend to be quicker in renegotiating existing contracts. Such
'tightening' behaviour is even expected. As put by an editorial in The
Times: "To old hands in the oil industry a changing government attitude
... comes as no surprise.... As oil is found and the area is no longer
a purely speculative venture, the terms for exploration and production
inevitably become tougher.."86
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But as it stands this theoretical framework cannot tell whether a
tightening of terms will be retroactive or not. The question of retro-
activity in concessions is important because the concept itself has clear
ideological overtones That a producer - state slavishly sticks to a
principle of no renegotiation of existing contracts is often a result
of adherence to a legal principle that bears no relation to the best
interests of that state ,  something  that  is increasingly being recognized
worldwide .  If the principle is nevertheless accepted ,  then it can
be because it is in accordance with, or thought to be part of, normal
behaviour in western law; because ,  in short, it is part of the ruling
ideology .  Smith and Wells ,  while stressing the same factors as Mikesell
in their dynamic analysis ,  argue on the basis of studying a number of
mineral agreements in the third world : " Although most agreements are
written to cover periods  varying  from 15 to 99 years ,  an agreement
rarely remains unmodified for more than a few years ," 87 and they
continue : " ...  the practise is clear: concession contracts have been
constantly altered. Economic, political ,  and social factors have become
more potent than legal factors in determining  the viability  and shape
of concession arrangements ."' 88 Historical data from the oil industry
tend to give the same conclusion. When the objective conditions under-
lying a concession agreement change, there is every reason to expect a
renegotiation of the initial terms. The recently negotiated national -
ization agreements in the oil industry for example could have been
expected once the overall bargaining strength of the producer-states
changed from. 1970 onwards .  Odell writes about the inevitability of such
renegotiations once the objective conditions change. The companies
objected strongly to the announced plans of an excess profit tax both
in Norway and the UK following the quadrupling of oil prices. But
according  to Odell, there  were large elements  of bluff in  the companies'
attitude because the announced plans were in fact acceptable tax
proposals , " about which there never ought to have been any doubt given
the size of the rent involved ". 89 Adelman shares the same view, even
if it is stated in a less direct manner.90
But the principle of renegotiation is not exclusively confined to
raw material concessions .  It also applies to high technology industries
in industrialized countries ,  The US government in its dealings with the
defence industry is constitutionally obliged to initiate rewriting of
existing contracts if it can be shown that the industry is earning
'excess profits ', 91 It was the existence of such agreements in the
59
West at the same time as the international companies and their home govern-
ments vigorously condemned any rewriting of existing oil contracts, which
leads one to draw the conclusion that insisting on the inviolability of
existing contracts was partly 'ideological' in nature. 92 We  can accordingly
use the fact of whether a producer-state adheres to the principle of non-
retroactive legislation  to indicate how closely such a state  adheres to
the 'rules of the  game' as commonly  interpreted by the West. ( here to
mean the OECD  countries). This could help  to determine ,  at least in
an ideological sense , a country' s adherence to the 'Western camp'.
(A genuine  break with this principle by the Norwegian  state in the field
of oil concessions  could have  been important as an indication that
Norway 's political  adherence to the West was weakening.)
Our first  approach to the question  of bargaining relies on the
size of the expected change in  oil-rents. While we have  postulated
that terms are likely to tighten  as the size  of the oil- rent increases,
the discussion  of 'retroactivity'  makes it clear that there is much
less  predictability  as to whether such tightening will be retroactive.
It should  also be noted  that if the key variable  is the size of the
expected rent , it follows that all information about this  expected rent
becomes of prime importance .  We have already  postulated  that 'informa-
tion'  is a commodity  which is part  of the bargaining process. We can
now see how  this factor fits into  our own theoretical framework.
2.5.11 A  synthesis93
Based on our discussion of 'exogenous change ',  we can use a diagram
which describes the undiscounted rent (footnote 33, above) to analyse
further the dynamic of bargaining.94
The initial bargaining between the oil companies and a producer-
state about the future claim to the oil-rent can only take place on the
basis of a hypothetical or 'as if' supply curve. The reason is simply
that no certain knowledge exists about the size of the future rent. The
key negotiating point is therefore to establish the exact position of the
supply curve which (given the price for oil) will determine the potential
(undiscounted) amount of rent. If the companies' negotiating teams can
locate this supply curve as far to the left and as price-elastic as
possible, the teams can then claim that very little oil-rent will accrue
from the geographic area in question.. Consequently, the companies could
argue that there is no reason why the producer-state should
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impose any strict terms and conditions on the exploitation, as such,
terms would achieve little in terms of capture of rent  ( 99 per cent of
a total rent of zero is  still  zero ), and should the state's policy be
formed  i n an awkward  enough way it might actually  be a hindrance
towards development (e.g. if the policy  were to consist  of pre-cash-
flow area fees).
The way the  companies  would  argue their case can also be established
bya certain amount of a priori reasoning.. They wil l as pointed out claim the
supply-curve is located a maximum distance towards the left (S2 in Figure 2.1).
And the higher  the expected necessary  rate of return  on an investment
in order to  induce a company to enter a geographic area, the further
the supply-curve will be located towards the left.  The standard
justification  for such an  attitude is invariably  one arising from
'risk'. The important factor then becomes whether such a claim is
accepted by the producer - state's negotiators .  The higher figure the
state accepts as being absolutely necessary to compensate for 'risk',
the less oil-rent there is to share between the two bargaining
protagonists .  Thus conceptually the first part of the negotiating
battle is to establish the exact value of the rate of return necessary
to induce the companies to enter in the first place.
The second element in the initial bargaining game is to determine
how much potential monopoly and differential rent there  i s to be earned
from the area . Again  the companies '  bargaining position would be to
minimize the total amount of rent that potentially exists by consistently
giving pessimistic estimates of the variables that determine the total
amount of rent. Once this is recognized , the vital  importance of
information becomes self -explanatory. The actor  that can define the
terms of the bargaining situation has already won half the battle. One
way of minimizing the actual amount of expected rent is for the companies
always to argue with reference to the marginal fields. This is a
bargaining strategy which, if accepted ,  will minimize the expected
amount of differential rent. In Figure  2.2, by  establishing an
artificially located point of reference ,  X1, the companies can give
the impression that the  supply- curve resembles S1, whereas it may be
more like S2. This is a strategy that  may carry  less weight as finds
of different characteristics are made ,  but it can have some importance
in the initial stages of the negotiations ,  when the state's level of
ignorance is substantial.
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Historically the 'normal' outcome of such negotiations has there-
fore been, not surprisingly, that the companies have managed to acquire
a high a priori prior claim to future oil-rent.
Once a find of oil (almost of whatever kind) is made, one element
of risk (that there are no hydrocarbons at all in the area) disappears.
Accepting the companies' own way of looking at the world, risk decreases
as the total average costs of finding a field decrease. Consequently
the supply curve shifts downwards towards the right, and the potential
oil-rent increases.
If the field found is larger (and/or with more favourable technical
characteristics) than was originally thought likely, then total oil-rent would
again increase as a result of shifts in the supply-curve from S3 to S4
(Figure 2.3). The 'as if' supply-curve (which now of course has a much
less hypothetical flavour) shifts down and to the right over time.
But not only does the supply-curve move according to the companies'
'objective' point of view. This shift is also likely to be perceived
by the producer-state if the government has increased its access to
information and expertise.
Assuming then that the situation for both the state and the
companies changes in the way outlined above, there will be pressure for
the government to change the terms on which it lets the companies oper-
ate. This reformulates the essence of Mikesell's 'dynamic behaviour'
described above. The state will claim that since there is evidently a
new situation (once it has perceived this itself!), the terms of
exploration ought to change. In new concessions, terms ought to be
tougher, while there will be a pressure on the state to renegotiate
existing-agreements.
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The basic ideas about the development of bargaining over time have
thus been given a graphic expression. However, in the above observa-
tions we have gone further than Mikesell. He tends to relate the
tightening of terms only to the ost-investment period, whereas we
have seen. that it is necessary to say something about the terms laid
down in the pre-investment period; terms which are based only on
perceived information. Within this framework a sudden increase in the
price of oil, ceteris aribus will lead to an increase in the total
amount of oil-rent in the same  way  as the dynamic of the 'normal'
company/state relationship outlined above. Hence it is likely to
produce a similar policy reaction from the state as in the case out-
lined above.
Any producer-state which has no immediate need for oil, and hence
does not want to maximize its output, is immediately in a much better
bargaining situation with respect to the oil companies. In Figure
3.4, this is shown by comparing an output of OQ1 (volume restriction)
with OQ2 (maximum output). By not having to go for the high-cost
ventures a volume-restricting state could press for a higher percentage
of rent per unit of output at the margin (ab). 95 This conclusion has
important consequences for assessing the Norwegian state's bargaining
situation in the period when a policy of volume restriction was in
force.
SFigure 2.4
A C%.
63
2.5.2 Peculiarities of the Norwegian state
The special nature of the Norwegian state, which we have discussed
at length in Chapter 1, is the second variable which can give insight
into the development of Norway's oil policies throughout the period
under discussion. An analysis  along  these lines is particularly
called for in the wake of the failures of traditional orthodox theory
to furnish satisfactory answers to the question of state intervention
(see Appendix D). It is only by examining in more depth the historical
peculiarities of the  Norwegian  state.that we can hope to arrive at an
explanation which does not suffer from the failures of orthodox theory.
Since the ahistorical properties of the orthodoxy  arise  out of its
methodological principle of individualism,  our explanation  proceeds in
a different way. As an example, in arguing for an historical, non-
individualistic examination of the state within the context of  Norwegian
oil policies, let us. consider the problem of technological independence.
The ability of a producer-state to be technologically  independent from
the companies  is important. in determining the relative  bargaining  strength
between companies  and producer-states. But the development of techno-
logical independence is not a natural process, but to a large extent one
which springs from political decisions. To understand the reasons for
such political decisions, a more in-depth understanding, of the state in
question is absolutely necessary. This approach is similarly a criticism
of those who try to draw conclusions from very abstract and general
theories of the modern state (see p.18). Our insight is partly
based on an analysis of the peculiar nature of the Norwegian state.
Apart from its neo-marxist overtones, the above approach to oil
policies forms part of a renewed interest of the approach of the
'institutional school' of economic analysis referred to in the
Introduction.
The third factor which influences the outcome of the bargaining
between companies and producer-states is the international context of
the bargaining situation. This factor has tended.to be overlooked in
attempts to analyse the Norwegian policies. Only Evensen (1971) has
given it major attention, but even in that case there was little
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systematic reference to the influence that the developments in the
industry could have on Norwegian policies .  Odell has also briefly
touched on the issue.96
We have already, in Chapter 1 and Appendix A, seen the importance
of adopting an international perspective to understand a country's oil
policy. The way the 50/50 principle of profit division spread throughout
the industry is only one of many examples. On an analytical level, the
international context has an importance on three different levels for
our case study.
First, the international context in part comprised solutions
attempted by other oil-producing states which the Norwegians could try
to imitate .  We shall see that the Iranian concept of participation was
especially influential with regard to Norwegian policies,
Secondly ,  and more importantly ,  the international contexts set
the limits of what the companies were willing to accept in the short
run as Norwegian policies .  For example the companies were at least in
the short run extremely reluctant to grant a participation share to the
Norwegian state when they were at the same time rejecting the principle
of participation in other parts of the world.
Thirdly ,  an international analysis can indicate the degree of
interest which the companies are likely to exhibit in the exploration
of potential new producing areas.
It is our task to show in this case study how the international
framework ,  understood along the above lines ,  constantly moulded the
outcomes of the state/company relationship in the Norwegian sector of
the North-Sea.
2.5.4 Summary
We have thus arrived at a preliminary list .  of three factors which
influenced the development of bargaining between the Norwegian state and
the international companies in the period 1965-74. These in our view
represent the three key elements in any explanation which tries to come
to grips from a historical perspective with the form and extent of state
intervention in the Norwegian oil industry during this period. It is
only by combining an. analysis of the three factors that we can satis-
factorily understand the development of Norwegian oil policies in this
period. To analyse any one of Factor 1: Exogenous changes in rent, or
Factor 2: The eculiarities of the Norwegian state, or Factor 3: The
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international context, in isolation from the other two is worthless.
For example, we may determine that there is an objective tendency
towards a  greater state involvement based on Factors 1 and 3. But there
is no way  we can  say anything about the form such a tendency will take,
or the speed at which it will be implemented (if at all), without knowing
something about the actual historical peculiarities of the state in
question. It is clear that Factors 1 and 3 provide the overall framework
for our analysis, but the actual outcome will obviously depend upon
Factor 2. However, it is only by carrying out our  case  study that we
can make  a final decision about how useful these three factors are.
Part III: The olic o tions
So far we have said little about how the rent can be appropriated
by the producer-state. We have in short neglected the different forms
of state action  and their effectiveness. An analysis of the different
.policy instruments may give us a theoretical presumption in favour of
one policy outcome in the North Sea, before we examine the Norwegian
case in more  detail.97
The different policy instruments can be classified in two ways.
First, they can be considered according to whether they do or do not
r
imply government ownership. At ene extreme we can have 100 per cent
government ownership exercised by a state oil corporation; at the other
we can have the government's use of purely fiscal measures.
The second distinction which runs between automatic and discretion-
ary instruments will be the basis for our initial analysis.
2.6 AUTOMATIC VS. DISCRETIONARY POLICIES
A choice between an automatic rent-appropriating system, the
'auction system', as advocated by Dam (1976) and Crommelin (1974), and
a discretionary system, can be made both on political and theoretical
grounds. But before we carry out such an evaluation between the two
approaches, one general point should be made. It is on methodological
grounds possible to group together the proponents of the automatic
system of rent-collection together with the thinking that Adelman
represents (see Section 2.1.11). Both represent an attempt to apply a
stringent neo-classical paradigm to the question of oil. There is in
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both approaches an implicit belief in the smoothness and efficiency of
market adjustments, a deep mistrust of state intervention,  and a  tendency
to regard political factors as merely ' exogenous ' to the whole analysis.
According to an automatic system rent is transferred from the
companies by the state by lump-sum cash payments that the companies
offer the state in advance for the right to explore an acreage.98 The
size of the bids would, according to this view, reflect the expected
rent that a company anticipated it could earn. If the bids  are secret,
competition  among  the companies would ensure that the  winning  bid would
fully reflect  the expected rent to be  earned by that company. There
would be pressure for the companies to maximize  their bids; if not they
would simply  not get the  right to explore  the area, which would be
taken up by  somebody else. Such a system would ,  according to one of
its warmest proponents , "by utilizing the price  system, allocate
resources  better within  the economy ". 99 The companies would not earn
rent , while the  most efficient  firm ( being able  to offer the  largest
sum of money at any one time ),  would  get the right to extract the oil.
Proponents  of the auction  system often compare it with the dis-
cretionary allocation system , which they (rightly ) criticize as being
unable to collect the full amount  of rent. The  difference is often
described in terms of  two fundamentally different  methodological
approaches.  The auction system relies on the market ,  while ,  according
to Dam , " The argument  for the discretionary system boils down  to the
assertion that economic  inefficiency  is sometimes convenient, that,
for example ,  it is useful to a government  for political  reasons to
favor local  over foreign companies ."100 The implication of his view is
that state intervention in the economy, as in the discretionary system,
will lead to inefficiency.
But there  are a number  of reasons why the auction  system is in-
efficient  in extracting  the rent  and, given  the objectives of the
North Sea states in  1965, could be said to be considerably  worse than
a discretionary system . First, its efficiency depends  upon a number
of crucial  assumptions . There  must be no  collusion  among  the major oil
companies . If there is, the whole bidding process  becomes meaningless
as an expression  of future expected rent. The chance of such collusion
is particularly  great in  a highly concentrated industry like the oil
industry. Secondly, and equally seriously, the auction approach argues
that if the oil-province in question turns out to be a bonanza this will
be balanced out by other cases where no oil is found despite a huge
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amount of money having been spent on the bids .  While this may turn out
to be the case on a world-wide scale ,  it is scant consolation for a
government that accepts this system .  A bonanza would ,  in almost all
countries of the world ,  immediately lead to the charge of 'having given
the oil away ',  with subsequent demands for the rewriting of contracts,
nationalization ,  etc. Knowing this to be the case ,  the companies would
be reluctant to bid the full amount of expected oil-rent ,  thus under-
mining the whole theoretical rationale of the auction system. It is
therefore not surprising that the quantitative importance of the
auction system has been relatively unimportant . 101 Thus, whereas the
auction system claims to represent the 'painless '  way forward for
company/ state relationships ,  it may in fact turn out that the opposite
is the case .  Finally ,  the auction system implicitly dismisses any
arguments based on the  ' infant industry '  case, by labelling as economic-
ally  ' inefficient '  a system that allows for protective measures in
favour of national involvement in the oil industry .  This is especially
doubtful in an industry like oil, which requires a relatively long period
of time for the infant to grow into adulthood ,  particularly with respect
to the mastery of technology and the high barriers to entry. Apart from
the above arguments ,  the auction system also exclusively concentrates
on the state ' s aim of rent - maximisation and disregards the relationship
between the other aims of the state and different policies it can pursue.
On the part of the companies ,  the auction system is not viewed with
much enthusiasm .  Paying out a relatively large amount of money at the
beginning of a period can become a considerable burden on the cashflow
of a company. It also means in practice that only the largest firms
have a possibility of bidding .  As was observed about the situation of
one offshore field: "The capital necessary to bid on tracts in the Gulf
of Mexico has eliminated most independent oil operators ..." 102 This
scepticism was echoed by PPS, which argued that the auction system was
only feasible in relatively proven areas ;  that there were no guarantees
that the highest bidder was really competent to undertake the work; that
it gives the state little control over subsequent operations; that there
was no assurance that the less attractive areas would be explored; and
finally that it would mop up funds which should be used for exploration. 103
The one positive thing to be said for an auction system is that it
can alert the public at large as to the amount of rent that is being
transferred to the comp .anies.104
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2.7 STATE PARTICIPATION VS. TAXATION
Given the unacceptability of the auction system, the main choice
for Norwegian policy makers was whether to attempt a pure 'tax solution'
or whether to try to capture the rent by means of state participation.
This section will first examine whether there are any a priori theoretical
reasons for choosing one as opposed to the other. We do this by studying
the effects of the two policy instruments on the NPV of a hypothetical
oil-field. The evaluation is initially made on the restrictive assump-
tion that the state wants to raise a fixed amount of money and that
state participation is like our Scenario 3, outlined in Section 3.5.1.
Based on a hypothetical case study, it is possible to arrive at a
relative evaluation of the different policy instruments.
105 Not surpris-
ingly ,  the 'worst '  policies for a company with respect to a discounted
variable are those that involve considerable outlays at the very beginning
of the life of a project .  Hence ,  as indicated by van Meurs, the relative
rating between different policies would be as follows: "Initial bonus;
bonus at the discovery - date; then a group of elements comprising:
fixed royalties ,  income tax with and without depletion allowance, and
state participation ;  and finally rising surface duties . "
106 Broadly
speaking ex ante payments with respect to discovery are rated lowest
and ex post payments highest ,  with combinations of the two somewhere
in the middle.
We now turn to a comparison between state participation and
taxation ,  when the company initially foots all the costs, but when the
state has to pay back to the company its share of all costs after
discovery .  Then the effects of state participation depend firstly
upon the interest rate which is used to calculate the compensation
that the firm receives from the state for its initial outlays .  If this
interest rate is less than the internal rate of return that the project
initially yielded, then the act of state participation is a clear short-
run economic loss for the companies . 107 Otherwise the state simply pays
a fixed share of capital costs and receives the same share of the
returns.
A comparison between the two broad sets of policies also depends
upon the discount rate. A 10 per cent rate of discount will in our
example bring about a drop in the NPV of a project if state participa-
tion is introduced. But if all income and expenditure is discounted at
15% with the compensation rate of return fixed at 12 %,  we have the
surprising result that even if the necessary capital-base for the
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companies has shrunk, the NPV to be earned with state participation is
higher for the company (has a smaller negative NPV) than the case with
no state participation at all . 108 So at a discount rate greater than
the IRR it will pay the companies to accept state participation. The
reason for this is that the compensation paid by the state is assumed
to be reinvested at the higher rate.
If state participation is compared with taxation ,  the depreciation
condition stipulated in the  ' taxation package '  takes on a special
significance .  The nature of the depreciation schedule is perhaps the
single most important factor in determining the companies' NPV.
According to Lovemore:
"... if depreciation continues throughout the life of a particular
oilfield ,  each year ' s depreciation being equal to the percentage
of the total oil reserves produced in that  year,  then on a market
price for the oil of $12 per barrel ,  in order to obtain a DCF
return of 25% the net profit per barrel would have to be in the
order of $3 . 20+, which is in the Government's view ,  unacceptably
high.
On the other end of the scale, if the oil companies are
permitted to depreciate their development costs as early as
possible in the production life of the field, thereby  ensuring
that during the bulk of the life of the field the total cash
inflow will be limited to the net profit per barrel, then to
obtain a DCF of 25 %  a very much lower net profit per barrel
is required."109
The changes in the Norwegian depreciation conditions are therefore
crucial variables to analyse.
The relative advantage of state participation compared with a
taxation package  thus  depends upon depreciation conditions,
interest rates for compensation and rates of discount.
All conclusions so far have been made on the assumption that all
outcomes are known with certainty. When we allow for uncertainty the
tax solution initially comes.out as marginally more favourable to the
oil company than a participation solution .  But when a full apprecia-
tion is made of state participation under uncertainty ,  there seems
to be very little difference between the instruments of state partici-
pation and taxation. 110
So far we have only discussed the effect of one policy instrument
at a time. But the influence of a policy package which includes more
than one' policy instrument may be greater than the sum of the effects
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of the individual policies that make up such a package, because the differ-
ent instruments influence one another. The clearest example of such an
interrelationship is when fixed royalty payments can stop a project towards
the end of its life, which as a consequence will lead to a drop in total
government take. But generally this effect can be ignored. ill
Thus when we assess the relative virtues of taxation vs. participa-
tion as an instrument for capturing the rent for a producer - state, the
theoretical framework ,  as it stands ,  gives no definitive a priori
reasons for preferring one policy as opposed to the other .  This choice,
both under conditions of certainty and of uncertainty ,  depends upon a
combination of the rate of interest used for repayment, the discount
rate ,  the IRR and whether the state has to pay for exploration costs.
However ,  a company which chooses between different taxation instruments
would obviously prefer a tax burden which is levied as late as possible
and a depreciation policy that allows it to write off its investments
as fast as possible.
2.7.1 Effectiveness
Unfortunately it is seldom  that policy  makers are faced with the
choice of how to obtain  $ X million more from an oil company using whatever
method seems most appropriate .  Therefore ,  while the former preliminary.
discussion was useful to establish the companies '  most preferred policies,
(ceteris aribus )  we have to take the analysis one step further ._ We must
determine  the likely  effectiveness of the different  policy  instruments.
And, as we will see, there are plenty of reasons for the state to prefer
one policy instrument  to another  once we enter the real world.
(i) Taxation
Taxation has been and still remains the most commonly used method
for collecting rent from the oil companies .  But the method suffers
from at least four potential weaknesses.
The normal way of taxing natural resources is to stipulate a
rate of tax in. advance which. is then difficult for the producer-state
to change .  The tax rate initially tends to be low either in order
that the state can attract foreign investment ,  or if the investing
firms can convince the state that their expected return is uncertain.
But under such circumstances it is widely recognised in the literature
that, to quote Garnaut and Ross:
"the conventional means of taxing natural resource projects.
... give governments  that control the use of the resources
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an unnecessarily small share of the benefits of successful
projects." 112
If an oil strike economically proves unexpectedly successful, then
the producer-state will immediately be under pressure to change the
original contracts because the total amount of rent will be higher than
anticipated. This in turn can lead to instability and possibly to
reduced investment. Alternatively, if there is a lagged or even no
adjustment in the government ' s tax rate ,  often because of the government's
adherence to the principle of 'sanctity of contracts', then there will be
a loss of rent to the state.
Secondly there are extreme difficulties in implementing a 'tax
regime' of  ' fine tuning ',  by which we mean a system that is so flexible
that it captures all rents as these arise .  Even such a well - planned and
advanced tax regime as the UK North Sea taxation of 1974 has been unable
to leave the companies with the 'normal '  rate of return, but has instead
turned out to encourage the very opposite of what it was meant to accomp-
lish.113 Such difficulties arise particularly in industries like the oil
industry where there are continuously changing circumstances.
Thirdly ,  the 'taxation solution '  implies by definition that the
producer - states rely on the services of international oil firms to
produce their oil. The nation - state will lose potential rent to the
extent that a firm withdraws its services when the rate of return on
its investments falls below what it considers its normal return. If,
on the other hand ,  a national state oil company was established to
produce oil, it would possibly be content with a rate of return equal
to the social discount rate, which is lower than the rate required by
the company and which would leave more of the rent to the state.
The fourth  reason  for the 'suboptimality' of a taxation solution
is related to the many possibilities of tax evasion by the companies.
To the extent that this loss can be avoided by increased information
and learning by the state  ( and is therefore conceptually different from
the three reasons given above ),  it can be questioned whether it should
be included in this list at all. On the other hand, the industry has
historically turned out to be one of the most difficult to control.
Whenever the producer - states have considered themselves to be in full
control with respect to the tax situation, they have invariably been
faced with new tax - evasive tax management solutions  by the  companies.
This does not constitute any definitive proof that this will always be
the case. On the other hand it is an indication of the difficulty
which any taxation solution will have to solve.
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Agreements in the past contained not only weak clauses in the
form of low tax percentages, but the producer-states were often also
'short-changed '  in the computation of these percentages .  Most of.the
companies' opportunities for 'tax management' have been due to the
international and vertically integrated nature of the oil industry and
the subsequent possibility of manipulating intra-firm financial trans-
fers. Such actions have not been confined to less developed countries,
with a weak administrative structure like Iran in the 1950s114 During
the 1960s such practices also led to drains on the balances of payments
and shortfalls in corporation taxes paid to the importing countries,
including Norway Csee p.17). The major companies ,  according to
Tudgendhat , 115 even went to the point of setting up new subsidiaries
for reasons of 'tax management'.
For a producer - state it is also necessary for tax purposes to
monitor the production costs of the companies .  But this is no easy
task ,  especially if there is an historically strong corporate link
between the suppliers of the investment goods to the oil industry and
the producing company. To deal with such a situation, the producer
state will have to train an experienced staff which must have ready
access to comparative cost data to check the data received by the
companies.  This interestingly almost requires that there is a state
oil corporation through which the tax authorities can obtain such
information .  An effective tax regime from the state ' s point of view
may therefore presuppose the existence of the state - participation
solution ,  which we initially saw as an alternative to a 'tax solution'.
Garnaut and Ross have advocated what amounts to a progressive
tax on raw material extraction in order to devise a type of taxation
that is immune to the objections presented above. The tax rate is
meant to increase when certain threshold internal rates of return have
been reached so that the 'tax holiday '  which every firm enjoys after
the end of its investment period would be inversely proportional to
the profitability of the project at hand. Such a solution would also
make unnecessary the ad hoc negotiations which take place between
investors and host governments and would decrease the bureaucratic
and administrative burden of implementing such a scheme.
Even if such a scheme would go some way towards making the
'taxation option' more attractive and in part solve some of the
problems outlined above, it still leaves open a number of questions.
First of all, what determines the specified interest rate under which
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"the value of net assessible receipts from the beginning of the proj-
ect"116 is  to be computed ? T his is equivalent to answering the almost
impossible question of which rate a producer-state should set as 'normal'
or 'acceptable '  before the resource tax comes into operation. Secondly,
while such a tax system has on one occasion been implemented (the
Bougainville copper mine in Papua New Guinea ),  it is still to early
to evaluate how it has turned out in practice .  And thirdly, the tax
117
system still relies on the company ' s "revealed profitability ", which
does not solve all the problems connected with a producer - state's
monitoring of costs.
(ii) State  rtici  ation118
We will now  examine  the effectiveness of state participation as a
policy option. The historic trend towards state participation has in
most cases  been parallelled by the. development of state oil corporations
which control part of the oil-rent through their equity holdings.
We will assume  that the equity share of Statoil is part of the  state's
share of rent and that there is a correspondence  between Statoil's
equity income and the benefits to 'society  as a whole ',  here represented
by the central  government . As we shall see later, the functioning of
Statoil led to strong  disagreements  within Norwegian political life
where one  of the main points of disagreement was precisely whether such
a correspondence  could be assumed. The effectiveness of the state's
pursuit of this policy will therefore firstly depend on how much of
the rent collected by the state oil corporation is passed on to the
central state qua state. If there is a tendency for a state oil corpora-
tion to develop corporate aims of its own, which implies that there
is no automatic congruence between the interests of the state oil
corporation and the state, then the policy option of state participation
may be less advantageous for the producer-state than originally thought.
The pure financial strength of a state oil corporation may give it sub-
stantial financial 'muscle' in its bargaining position within a nation-
state, so that it may try to pursue  aims  that conflict with the overall
aims of the state.119 On a relatively trivial level it may try to give
its own personnel a number of 'perks' normally unavailable to state
employees. More importantly, such a company may unilaterally want to
pursue a policy of expansion, whether internationally within the oil
business or through diversification into other areas. This tendency
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for state oil corporations to become 'states within states' is a
frequently observed phenomenon within the industry, which has assumed
serious  dimensions  in as politically and geographically diverse cases
as SONATRACH in Algeria, 120 Pertamina in Indonesia,
121
and the French
state oil sector.122 This tendency is perhaps not so surprising
because the state corporations are often staffed with personnel who
have been trained within a 'traditional' industry, and whose behaviour
thus to some  extent reflects  the normal  practice  and ideological
attitudes of that background .  In particular the urge to expand seems
almost irresistible in the oil industry ,  irrespective of whether the
capital that finances a particular firm originates from the state or
from private sources.
The second reason why state participation may be 'non - optimal' as
a way of extracting rent is related to the potential loss that such a
policy can entail. To the extent that state participation means higher
costs of extraction or lower efficiency than an alternative solution,
it is legitimate to talk about a 'sub-optimal '  policy in a restricted
sense of the word. There is, for example ,  often considerable political
pressure that any joint venture shall buy or rent goods and services
from the producer - state's national suppliers ,  often at higher cost than
the international going price.
But even when we take the above very real problems associated
with state participation into account, this policy instrument still
has one clear advantage over taxation as a way of extracting rent.
By taking up a set percentage participation ,  the state will, due to
its equity ownership, automatically and without any further ado receive
at least a corresponding percentage of the rent from an oil-field.
(In addition it will of course also receive normal taxes from the
companies' share of profits .)  Such a policy will tend to increase a
producer - state ' s control over the oil-rent.
Apart from the greater assuredness that state participation gives
the state to control the rent from an oil-field, a state's preference
for a participation rather than a pure fiscal solution may be related
to the importance that state participation has for the producer-state
in the pursuit of other aims than rent-maximization. Without antici-
pating in detail our later analysis, we can briefly give  some  general
reasons for this'.
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One likely explanation can be found in the importance which state
participation has for volume control .  A joint venture agreement which
involves a state oil corporation as a member of the producing consortium
puts the state in a much better position to influence the production
profile from individual fields than either a taxation or an auction
solution . ( On the other hand ,  as long as private oil firms are involved,
there will always be pressure for the joint venture to conform to the
most profitable production profile from a  private point of view. And
private firms will always be able to argue that  they  entered such an
agreement on the understanding that no such interference was to take
place.)
The second reason why nation-states may want to opt for state
participation is related to the maximization of spinoff and balance of
payments effects of  the oil industry.  State participation can aid a
process of spinoffs because the scope for discrimination in favour of
national suppliers increases with the expansion of the state oil sector,
especially if this takes place through a state oil corporation.
However,  despite these alternative aims ,  the final and most import-
ant reason for choosing a participation solution is given above. State
participation when analysed as a concrete real-world phenomenon ,  rather
than an abstract theoretical  possibility,  gives a producer - state a
number of potential advantages ,  compared with either a tax solution
or an auction system ,  in controlling the rent in the oil industry.
2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter we have analysed different aspects of the three
objectives of bargaining between the companies and the producer states.
In conclusion  we will briefly  examine  the consistency of state policy
with respect to these three aims .  How are they interrelated? To what
extent are these aims contradictory?
Oil-rents and volume of roduction:
We have already shown how control over volume is just another way of
maximizing rent in social terms by using a social rate of discount.
To the extent that control over volume implies a slower rate of extrac-
tion, this  means  that the state will get access to its share of the
income from the oil-rents at a later date and/or it will receive less
income than. if the production of oil was carried out according to purely
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private criteria. If the producer-state imposes cuts in production
for the companies this implies that these will suffer a financial loss.
The state will therefore be under pressure to 'compensate' them in some
way. To the extent that such a compensation takes the form of a.cut in
the company ' s taxation burden this means there is a contradiction
between the two aims.
Volume  re ulation  and s inoff:
Assuming that the nation - state is capable of securing a fixed percentage
of all spinoff activities from an oil province ,  then there is a contra-
diction between these two aims. A restricted volume means less spin-
offs, ceteris aribus .  However, in the case where the spinoff industries
have to break into a new market there may be no contradiction between
the two aims .  A slower rate of output may make it possible for these
industries to 'catch up'. This choice has been perceived by public
policy-makers. 123
S inoffs and  rent maximization:
From a short - run perspective there may be a contradiction between
maximizing spinoffs and the maximization of rent ,  if volume control is
used as a way of increasing spinoffs .  But in the long run this contra-
diction may change. A development of national spinoff industries can.
increase a producer - state ' s ability to undertake the task of producing
oil itself ,  and hence be instrumental in excluding the companies from
future access to oil-rents altogether.
Balance of a ments  and volume of roduction:
The maximization of the balance of payments effect from oil exploration
often features as a separate aim that nation - states should pursue. It
has been particularly important for understanding the UK case.124
The fulfilment of this aim is normally presented as being intimately
linked to a maximization of volume of production .  There is however no
such easy and direct connection between the two. The net balance of
payments effect of oil production does not only depend upon volume of
.production .  It also depends upon the national content of spinoffs; the
ability of foreign companies to repatriate the profits it earns from
oil production  ( and hence touches on the degree of foreign ownership
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in the oil sector) as well as the amount of capital raised abroad; and
finally the amount of value added accruing from oil which is being
processed nationally. 125 126
our analysis of the overall relationship between the international
companies and an oil-producing state which can be of use in analysing
the Norwegian case study has now been concluded. We have put forward a
new framework of analysis because the existing attempts to conceptualise
the relationship between producer-states and companies, be they of a
general127 or more specific character, have turned out to be unsatisfactory.
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CHAPTER 3
OUR CASHFLOW MODEL AND OPERATIONALISATION OF THE
BARGAINING VARIABLES
One of the aims of our work is to quantify the outcome of the barg-
aining process between the Norwegian state and the oil companies. A
crucial part of this task will be to determine the state/company division
of rent over time. To successfully do this we must first operationalise
the definition of rent given in Chapter 2. This is done in Part I of this
chapter. We must then construct a detailed cashflow model for North Sea
fields. The latter task, which is accomplished in Part II, is necessary
to find the total amount of rent from hypothetical finds in the North Sea.
Our cashflow model also incorporates different state policy instruments,
both in the form of taxes and participation. This helps to determine the
division of the rent between the two protagonists in the battle for the
oil rent. How this division changes over time can then help us to say
something about the shifts in the relative bargaining strength between
the companies and the Norwegian state.
Part I: 0 erationalisations
3.1 OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPT OF RENT
Having defined rent. in the oil industry, we are still faced with
the task of operationalising the concept. This is a lengthy and compli-
cated task. Before arriving at the final definition that we will use
throughout the thesis (p. 89 below), we have to face three questions:
(a) We must find an adequate measurement of profitability.
(b) We must choose an appropriate discount rate.
(c) Finally we must deal with the problem of risk and uncertainty.
We will discuss each problem in turn.
3.1.1. Measurement  of rofitability
Given our definition of rent (p.36), we must first find an adequate
measurement of profitability. Unfortunately there is no accepted
discounted method of measuring profitability. According to Newendorp:
"There is probably no single method of calculation that completely
describes all the dimensions of profitability."1 We will initially
I
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single out the three most important and most frequently used measure-
ments of profitability. Their nature, and interrelationship, is readily
appreciated by means of the formula
t=y C.X = E
t=0 (1 + z) t
where Ct refers to a positive or negative cash flow from an investment
at time t1, X is the (Net) Present Value of the project, and z is the
rate of interest.
Or in graphic form:
C '
t
t=0
The three common measurements of profitability can then be expressed
by using the above formula.
1. Pay-out time is found when z=0, x=0
2. Internal rate of return (IRR) = z
When X = 0 and y = lifetime of the project
3. Present value (PV) = X
When y = lifetime of the project and z = the chosen discount rate.
(When the cashflow is computed post-tax X is labelled Net Present
Value (NPV)).
undiscounted criterion of 'government ake' does, on the other hand,
assess the  influence of specific policies  on the companies . The simple
Appendix C evaluates in detail the merits of these different
measurements for our purpose and concludes that the best starting point
for an operationalisation of oil-rent is to find the present value of
an oil-field. This is because the IRR-criterion does not tell us any-
thing about the relative importance of the companies' absolute share
of oil-rent from a given field. An IRR of 50% on what is 5% of total
capital outlay of an oil-field is relatively unimportant from a point
of view. which wants to emphasise the state's overall control over rents.
We will, however, make use of the IRR criterion later on when we want to
rent unless we postulate that the timing of costs and revenues to the
It therefore remains an unacceptable measurement of profitability and
not tell us anything about the time perspective of the investment.
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state is of no importance. But this measurement does nevertheless
have a crucial importance with respect to the absolute size of the
government's share, which the IRR says nothing about.
Having decided that the PV of a field can serve as a proxy for
the oil-rent., we still have to determine the 'normal rate of profit'
in order to operationalize our definition of rent. We will see that
there are difficulties in determining this magnitude for the private
sector, and hence that there are difficulties in determining which
discount rate to use to find the PV. This is because the.-discount
rate, in an equilibrium situation, can normally be approximated to the
'normal rate of profit' in the economy.2
The determination of the exact magnitude of a 'normal rate of
profit' has been the central and underlying element in the confrontations
between governments and oil companies in the North Sea. There has been
full agreement between the two that part of,.this rate of return should
include amortization for former costs of looking for oil. But the key
conceptual problem arises when one assesses the future investment needs
of the companies .  Should one consider as 'rent '  the amount of profit
above 'normal profits' which is necessary to finance future (and in-
creasingly expensive )  exploration of oil? As Adelman has put the case:
"Part of . ' rent' must be regarded as 'quasi-rent' because it is a surplus
in the short run, but not in the long run."3 We will return to this
problem in the more specific historical context of the North Sea, and
at the moment just point to a number of general problems that arise
if such a procedure is accepted.
First , it makes it possible for the oil companies to claim that
there never are any 'excess profits' earned in the oil industry, given
the huge needs for new investment in the industry in the coming decades.
Cases have been known where all notions of 'excess profits' have dis-
appeared in company accounts because the companies have assumed that
60% of their future (and expected higher) capital costs should be
4generated from internal funds and therefore were part of costs.
Secondly, and closely related to the above point, the oil industry
has always had a remarkably high degree of self-financing. 5 Maintain-
ing such a high level in an increasing cost situation automatically means
a lower declared rate of return. But there is anyway nothing intrinsic-
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ally desirable from a social point of view in maintaining such a high
degree of internal finance in the oil industry.
Thirdly, in order to justify the existence of high profits, one
must argue that higher profits for the companies will lead to a more
intense exploration activity .  This may be the weakest  ' link' in the
chain of argument because there has recently been a tendency for oil
companies to use their oil profits to diversify into non-oil fields
like insurance ,  supermarkets ,  motor-hotels etc. This was particularly
true in the US in the aftermath of the OPEC price increase in 1973/74.6
Furthermore, the alleged lack of competition between different sources
of energy ,  often controlled by the oil companies, has also cast doubt
on the validity of this link .7
Fourthly ,  there are three main criteria which can be used by a firm
,to determine its discount rate: the marginal opportunity-cost of capital
for the firm; the cost of capital; or a combination of the  two (see
below ).  The choice between these different criteria is of great
importance ,  because an acceptance  of the first may yield  a private
irate of discount  which  is higher than the second one.
We will argue here that within the context of the North Sea, if
we are to choose a rip vate discount rate, it is the second criterion
which should constitute the basis for an appropriate discount rate.
The reason for this is twofold:
A firm which  i s confronted with two projects, one in the North Sea
and one say off South - East Asia, which both yield high rates of return,
has to make one crucial assumption when it chooses one project and uses
the other as 'opportunity - cost of capital '.  It has to assume that the
second project will always be available into which the firm can re-
invest at the high rates of return the earnings from the first project.
If the second project is not available in the future ,  but only when the
original choice had to be made ,  then the opportunity - cost of capital
when the original decision was made is irrelevant for a full
appreciation of the project.
If, on the other hand, there are no capital constraints on a firm,
then even a firm which permanently earns a rate of return in
excess  of the 'normal' rate (and which therefore will have a high
opportunity - cost of capital )  will be induced to invest in projects as
long as its expected return is in excess of the cost of borrowing.
The main question is therefore to determine whether there are permanent
capital constraints for a firm operating in the North Sea. I.e. can a
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firm invest as much as it wants in the North Sea? The existence of the
consortium method of financing suggests that this is the case.8 On
the other hand it can be argued that there is a continuous constraint
on the number of rigs, skilled personnel ,  and a lack of continuous new
acreage .  However ,  all of these constraints can be said to be temporary
constraints , 9 and hence there seem to be good a priori reasons why no
capital constraints exist in the North Sea. As a .  consequence the
relevant rate of private discount for our purpose is the cost of
capital.
The most important consequence to follow from this is that the
common method of adjusting the private rate of discount upwards in
1Operiods of inflation by the whole expected rate of inflation is
incorrect. We can only adjust for inflation to the extent that this
higher inflation rate has already been reflected in higher interest
rates.
But there are not only difficulties in defining the appropriate
private rate of discount. It is also possible to argue that the private
and the social rates of discount for projects in the North Sea differ.
We will not review here the whole literature concerning the difference
between the private and social rate of discount , 11 but rather deal with
the problem within the context of the North Sea.
When evaluating  the return  from a project in the North Sea in order
to decide  whether the project should  be undertaken or not, such an
assessment can be made either from the standpoint  of society  as a whole
or from  the standpoint of a private oil firm. It  is possible to have a
situation where a society might be willing to develop a field, while
the private  firm will  not do so because there is a difference between
the private  and the  social rate of discount. If the investment
criterion is that a  project will  be undertaken as long as there is a
positive expected present value to be earned ,  then it is possible to
imagine a project which when evaluated at the  ( higher )  private rate of
discount will yield a negative present value ,  while at the (lower)
social rate of discount will give a positive present value .  The main
reasons why there is a difference between the private and the social
rate of discount will now be made clear.
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A private company which makes  a micro - economic assessment about
future investment must try to incorporate a notion of uncertainty
nto its calculations .  For the specific firm there is a fixed stat-
tical chance that the future level of key variables will deviate from
the expected mean  ( even if this mean can be assumed known by the
f  f uture markets ).  To compensate for this uncertainty thexistence o
m'normally requires a rate of return which is higher ,  and hence
e's a higher rate of discount than if the future was known with
ertainty ,  or if these uncertainties did not exist .  With respect to
p
cel out in the event of full state ownership ,  would be the geological
k and the corresponding size of the oil deposits which have been
12 By contrast the state is notwn to be log - normal distributed .
sect tohis risk; hence it will then be able tobase its calcula-
nson the mean  of the future expected  value of the variables in
'13 s rate.tion . Its discount rate is lower than the private sector
second argument is conducted at a slightly different level of
traction .  It argues that only a social rate of discount should have
ymeaning for policy-makers because the private rate ofdiscount is
rgely irrelevant in oil production in the historical situation of a
.number of p oducer - countries .  We have argued that oil production gives11
rise to permanent rents. Because the income associated with these rents
does not correspond  to the value of goods  and services  used in the production
of oil, but rather reflects the transfer of an economic surplus from
other parts of the economic system to the oil-producing state, a number
of particular problems tend to arise in oil-producing states. If we
talk about relatively large producers these rents can lead to important
structural problems for the economies in question .  These are most often
described as 'absorption -problems',  but hide a number of different pro-
cesses.  Saudi Arabia ,  Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates face the
problem that there is not enough productive investment within their own
boundaries on which this rent can be spent. Since a number of other
outlets for their investments are closed for political reasons, their
social opportunity rate of return is the rate obtainable in so-called
'safe '  placements in the Western financial markets, normally long-run
US treasury. bonds. This rate is certainly drastically lower than the
private oil companies '  discount - rate. For other countries like Norway
even the expectation of large future rents from oil production in the
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North Sea has led to an overvalued currency and the highest unit costs
f OECDi t h d ion  o any coun ry. T is ten ency  will increase n stepproduct
h the oil production itself. These effects plus the more long-run
irect effects of the increased state expenditure which will follow
as a result of the oil revenues in the 1980s, can result in a deep
ructural transformation in the Norwegian economy. (See Chapter 7 for
f some of these likely changes. This trend was alreadydescription o
visible in the partial collapse of some Norwegian export industries in
1977-78.) Iran is today in a broadly similar situation where agricultural
roduction has dropped drastically as a result of the structural changes
related to oil. Different societies will value these consequences of oil
diffproduction erently. But the main point is that because of the
characteristics of oil production (high rents) it is in the above cases
almost impossible to limit any analysis of depletion to the micro-economic
epletion path of one single oil-field using a private discount rate.
Such an exercise should be largely irrelevant when a nation-state decides
whether to produce oil or not, which depends much more on an analysis of
the wider structural and political implications of oil production.
For us, the main consequence of the above discussion is that the
social rate of discount becomes the ap to riate di-count rate to com ute
the rent from oil=fields in the North Sea, and that the rate of discount
must be lower for the state than for the private companies, i.e. the
state should exploit oil at a slower rate than the companies.14
Two comments should be made in this context.
While the social rate of discount may be the theoretically correct
discount rate, in our economic case study it is not the state which
decides whether to develop the field or not. This decision is taken
by the private company according to its own criteria. Hence it is
possible to argue that the relevant discount rate is the private one,
since it is the companies' decision which 'counts'. If a project's
IRR falls between the social and the private rate of discount the
state can only develop this project if it pays a subsidy to the firm
(as long as it won't undertake this project on its own through a state
oil corporation).
Despite the difference between the 'theoretically correct' and
'politically relevant' rates of discount, this difference may not be
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as large as is often assumed. By choosing the cost of capital instead
of the higher  ' opportunity - cost of capital' as the relevant private rate
of discount ,  this means that the difference between the private and the
social rates of discount shrinks ,  even if we must stress that a differ-
is
ence does indeed exist.-
(ii) Risk and the rate of discount
It is frequently postulated that the oil companies need a return
above the  ' normal '  or 'minimum' rates of profit to protect themselves
against the  ' risk '  in the industry .  We will frequently find represent-
atives of ,  both governments and companies talking in such terms to justify
their own actions. We will now examine what consequences  ( if any ) ' risk'
has for the determination of a 'normal '  rate of profit and hence for the
rate of discount.
Before we analyse the different ways of measuring risk and assess
to what extent  ' risk '  is a legitimate concept in the industry, we must
look more closely into the different origins of risk in the  oil industry.
These are four-fold :  economic ,  engineering ,  geological ,  and political.16
Economic :  This category of risk involves all variables that directly
or indirectly affect the money - variables  ( as opposed to the physical
variables) in our discounted cash analysis. In this category we include
variables like the level of future prices .  But because companies are
only interested in net prices  ( i.e. post-taxes ),  economic risks must
be seen in relation to the next category of risk, political risk.
Political :  This risk element consists of factors that affect the net
value of the relevant money-variables (for instance by new taxation
measures ). The definition of political risks may be extended to mean
the threat of losing the whole capital value of the existing assets,
for example in a situation of a total nationalization without compensation.
Engineering risks refer to the material basis for the expected cost-
elements  in our analysis.. It includes risks related to the introduction
of new technology as well as to the normal day-to-day functioning of an
oil-field in hazardous conditions.
Finally, geolo ical risks are connected to the exploration phase.
Here risks are related both to the probability of finding oil as well
as to the likely amount of recoverable oil. Most analysis of risk is
directed towards this aspect of risk. (For a. further analysis related
to geological risks in the North Sea see Section 4.3,1.)
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All these elements of risk have one crucial ,  but often neglected,
factor in common: risk is not something that necessarily only works in
one direction and contrary to the interests of the oil companies. Risk
can also give pleasant surprises .  Taking each category of risk in turn
we see that prices may go up ;  the depreciation schedule used by the
government may be more favourable than originally thought; technological
changes may favour the tasks of the companies ; 17 and the oil province
in question may turn out to be a 'bonanza '.  This immediately suggests
that no simple statement that the oil industry is a 'high-risk' industry
will be sufficient .  First of all we have to distinguish different parts
of the industry and also relate risk to the cash outlays involved.
Exploration in the North Sea is cheap ,  but relatively uncertain comp-
ared with production ,  which is  very  expensive but relatively certain,
especially after the top of the learning curve has been reached (see
footnote 8 above). Secondly ,  one can insure against risk. This is
possible both politically  ( through different government export guarantee
schemes like the British ECGD) and also to cover engineering risk  ( through
ordinary ,  albeit expensive ,  methods of insurance).
Compensation for risk is traditionally thought to require a higher
rate of return on investment . 18 But how much higher ?  Determining the
rate of return that compensates for risk is impossible without making
specific assumptions about the nature of the risk in question. Using
a high interest rate as a discount rate simply indicates that the firm
in question wants to recover its investments as soon as possible. If
the relevant perceived risk by the company is located somewhere in the
medium- to long - run, then such a procedure obviously makes sense. If it
isn't  ( and for example the outlook in the medium -  to long - run seems
relatively stable with respect to economic risks like prices and
incomes ),  but the relevant risk is expected in the short run, then such
a procedure seems much less appropriate ,  because there is no way the
investment can be recovered before the risk appears .  And in the oil
industry it is the very short-run prospects which are generally regarded
as being of crucial importance ;  not the least because this is the period
when a substantial amount of any loan finance is normally due to be
paid back.
Secondly ,  the procedure of using high interest rates to account for
risk tends to work against any project which has a long time perspective
and can then lead to serious misjudgements with respect to investment
decisions  ( see p.313 ).  The contradictory nature of this .  criterion
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is especially seen if a high discount rate is used to adjust for
political risks,  e.g. in  third world countries. A high discount rate
encourages a rapid exploration of natural resources which can then lead
to accusations by the host-government that the resources are being
exploited 'irresponsibly', which in turn may increase the political
risk of nationalization.
Finally, in many contexts it may be important to differentiate
between different degrees of uncertainty. Imposing one interest rate
on the whole combination of different investment possibilities is there-
fore a far too simplified procedure .  We reed a procedure by which
different risks of different projects are expressed .  As one observer
has said:
"How does one establish the 'minimum cut-off' level of profit-
ability? Is it right to reject a relatively certain project having a
rate of return of 24 per cent (relatively  certain in the sense
of having  a high probability  of obtaining the predicted cash
flow) in favour of a high-risk, rank wildcat  which if successful
will yield  a rate of return  of 34 per cent?"19
The choice  of one single discount  rate to reflect  these different
conditions  is clearly too arbitrary.20
In this section we have both questioned the prevalent view that
the oil industry is inherently a high-risk industry,  and criticized the
normal way of describing  'risk'. This  leads us  to try to find other
solutions to the measurement  problem of risk.
3.1.3 Uncertaint
One solution to the measurement problem is to incorporate the
concept of uncertainty as a substitute for 'risk '  into a model of oil
exploration .  Such a procedure is relatively new within the industry;
some observers suggest that it had little importance until the mid
1960s.
The incorporation of uncertainty is in principle quite straight-
forward. The expected monetary value of a project is the net expected
present value of the project multiplied by the probability of occurance
of that project. Thus the Expected Monetary Value (EMV) of drilling a
well in the North Sea equals the expected present value of. this
investment times the probability that the well may yield a commercial
find minus the probability of drilling a dry hole times the cost of
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drilling such a hole .  It is also possible to incorporate the prob-
ability of the likely size of a find which will complicate the analysis.
If the PV element in this formula has been computed by using a
discount rate that is equivalent o the 'normal '  rate of return, then
any final EMV becomes an indication of the return over and above a
' normal return ',  the requirement of our original definition of rent.
We will broadly try to follow such a procedure in operationalising the
concept of  'risk'. The initial  expected success rate  in the North Sea
is set equal to the success rate for wildcat drilling in the world as
whole. As drilling developed in the North Sea this rate then changed
according to the developments in the North Sea.
This way of evaluating uncertainty incorporates what we call the
'mean-risk '  which accounts for how the mean of the expected income moves
as the success rate of drilling changes. But it disregards what we can
label  ' variance - risk', i . e. the distribution of PV around the mean.
In short it disregards the kind of risk which makes a firm prefer a
certain income of  $ X to an outcome with a probability of 0.5 that it
will earn  $ 0.5X or $1.5X.
Our operationalization of risk disregards this latter risk element
and only deals with the former .  This nevertheless goes a long way
towards the common usage within the industry of classifying risk. When
companies state that the 'risk '  in the North Sea has decreased, they
normally mean that the chance of finding oil has increased . 23 But in
order to establish the quantitative importance of the second kind of
risk we will run a number of sensitivity tests for our basic cost and
revenue data as well as for the drilling success-rates. 24
3.1.4 Conclusion
We are now in a position to operationalize our definition of oil-
rent. We want to determine the PV of an oil-field usin a social rate
of discount ,  adjusted to risk b inco orating the success - rate in
exploration.
Once we have determined the total rent from a field ,  we can then
examine in more detail the division of this total rent between the
companies and the Norwegian state.
The one author who has come closest to a similar definition of
rent is van Meurs (1971). Using his conceptual apparatus both in
situations of full certainty as well as in situations of uncertainty,
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he tries to analyse the relationship between .  companies and producer-
states in terms of division of rent.
There are nevertheless a number of unresolved problems in relation
to his methodology .  First ,  his basic assumption that the present
value of investment per barrel is an increasing function of total
25reserves is questionable . Secondly, he is never very explicit on
which rate of return on capital to use to find the 'floor-level' for
the computation of rent  ( the problem we have discussed in considerable
detail above ).  Is it the opportunity -cost for the  firms in the oil
industry, or simply  the average social rate  of discount ? Without such
a  ' closer specification ,  his analysis remains non - operative . Thirdly,
he assumes  that all profit  going to exploration will have to be earned
in extraction . This  is not necessarily true. In the real world it is
thought that companies have an annual general fund which they spend on
exploration the origin of which is all the different activities that a
vertically integrated firm engages in.
3.2 OPERATIONALISATION OF VOLUME CONTROL AND SPINOFFS
We need no new concepts in order -,to handle the consequences of
depletion controls .  The effects of any such controls at the micro-level
will be fully reflected in a change in the PV of an oil-field. A
macro - regulation of volume will on the other side yield no effects on
the PV and its division for the individual find.
The operationalisation of spinoffs requires relatively little
theoretical elaboration .  We are first interested in the percentage
of total capital expenditure necessary to bring a field into operation
which is spent in Norway. This figure is therefore not only an indica-
tion of how well the Norwegian state as a state is doing in the spinoff
industries, but is also an indication of how well both the Norwegian
state sector and and the Norwegian private sector together are doing.
Secondly, we are also interested in the total amount of forward spinoffs
like petrochemical industries, refineries.: etc. that were established
within Norway as a result of the oil production.
It should be noted that in neither of the two cases would an
'optimum' policy from the Norwegian state's side necessarily mean that
all forward and backward spinoffs accrue to Norway. We should also take
into consideration the important. content of the final output and the amount
of export orders won by the Norwegian industry (largely private) engaged
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in forward spinoffs. Finally, such a monetary quantification of
spinoffs says nothing about the way that the state helps or supports
private industry in gaining spinoff orders. We will in particular
return to this latter point as the case study unfolds.
We have constructed a computer cashflow model for different
hypothetical fields in the North Sea in order to determine the total
rent which originates from oil production in the area .  This cashflow
model, which can incorporate different notions of 'participation', will
be used throughout the Norwegian case study to determine the division
of rent between the Norwegian state and the companies .  It differs in
a number of ways from other cashflow models previously used to analyse
the situation in the North Sea. This is a convenient point to highlight
these differences.
3.3 THE DIFFERENCES FROM EXISTING MODELS
In contrast to the analysis carried out by Official White Papers
and oil economists in the past ,  which has relied on undiscounted figures
to determine the division of rent between the Norwegian state and the
international companies ,  we have assessed the historic division of rent
in discounted terms. The  first official  Norwegian government report
that treated the division of rent in discounted terms was not presented
until 1975 and then did not deal with any historical material.26 Our
attempts  to carry  out a discounted analysis from 1965 should therefore
represent a step forward in the understanding of the Norwegian state's
historic role in the North Sea. It is in particular important to
transcend the major weakness implicit in the undiscounted analysis that the
state and the companies do not care when they earn the net revenues.27 And
even if cashflow models today tend to use discounted figures in their
results ,  the interpretation of these results is often confused because
their theoretical underpinnings are not often properly understood.
Furthermore a discounted analysis is not universally accepted. Major
works like Robinson and Morgan  ( 1978 )  still examine the state's take
in undiscounted percentage terms.
Secondly, the majority of cashflow models that have been developed
to analyse North Sea oil-fields do not mention government participation.
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(Williams (1972)28 Ministr of Finance (1975),29 Surrey (1976),30 NS
31)• The ones that do (MIT (1976),32 Statoil (1974331976) ) make
explicit what is only implicit in the first group of models: a state
participation of X per cent means that the state gains access to an exact
corresponding percentage of either the undiscounted or discounted net value
of the field. Most importantly, as will be made clear later, in none of
these models  would participation affect the  companies ' internal rate of
return. As opposed to such a procedure we have developed four different
participation schemes which correspond to the four schemes operative in the
Norwegian sector up  until 1975,  none of which under normal assumptions
give the straightforward results outlined above .  The only example in
the North Sea of the  very  simplified version holding true would be in
case of participation as understood  by the British  National Oil
Corporation (BNOC )  in the  fifth round  of concessions ,  where BNOC will
pay a fixed percentage of total costs and receive a corresponding
percentage of total output.
Our third extension in comparison with what are 'normal' assumptions
in cashflow models refers to the treatment of exploration costs.
Instead of just listing the exploration costs, including the cost of
.delineation wells attributable to one field , we assess  the average
number of wells it takes for a company to find a commercial field within
one oil-producing province. But only a minor part of this total explor -
ation expenditure is attributable to one specific field. Consequently
in the instances where the state is liable for part of the exploration
costs we need to assess the percentage of exploration costs attributable
to the block where a commercial find is made. All other exploration
costs, including the costs of drilling dry holes on blocks where a
commercial find is never made, should be counted as costs to the
company, even if these according to all agreements concluded during the
period of study are not shared by the Norwegian state. Such procedures
tend to increase the total costs incurred by the company compared with
a traditional analysis, and should be included as a real resource cost
of finding a new field. This procedure has the advantage that it
allows us to assess in a more realistic manner the often-made claim
by the companies that they need a rate of return on capital in excess
of the 'normal' because of the high cost and risk of exploration.
The fourth albeit least novel modification from most cashflow
models is that we choose the social rate of discount to assess the PV
of the different fields.
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While the assumption of a zero-sum game implied in our definition of
rent is not necessarily relevant in all situations (e.g. to understand
the division of rent between OPEC and the international companies as a
whole when the price of crude quadrupled in 1973-74), it nevertheless
serves well as a working hypothesis with respect to the confrontation
between the Norwegian state and the companies where the price of oil
is exogenously given.
Finally, our model is constructed around what we label a 'historical'
methodology. To empirically 'fill' the cashflow model we will use data
as they were available at the time when the specific negotiations between
the Norwegian state and the companies took place, i.e. we try to re-
create the bargaining situation in the light of what was known at the
time of each bargaining round concerning costs, tax conditions, and
revenues, and not in relation to what subsequently turned out to be the
case. This seems to us to be the only correct procedure if we want to
have an insight as regards the historical effects and dynamics of the
issue of participation. To be more concrete; the only way to know
whether a new participation  agreement  entered into in 1969 constituted
a 'tightening' as far as the Norwegian state was concerned, is to evalu-
ate such an agreement in the light of the 1969 expected costs and
revenue figures. The final outcome is irrelevant for such an  assessment.
To obtain such data we have made use of company or independently
computed figures as they appeared in the professional press, stock-
broker reports, and newspapers at the time of each negotiating round.
Such a procedure has never before been undertaken to help to analyse
in a historic manner the development of the Norwegian oil concessions.
Only the roughest ideas in the form of 'government take' figures have
historically been at the disposal of any analyst who has wanted to
examine in more detail the nature of the participation agreements as
well as the first 1965 round of concessions. 34
A different methodological perspective also requires us to consider
the value of one variable which is disregarded in traditional analysis.
This is the total percentage of the PV which in one form or another
goes to the state. Orthodox theory is only normally interested in the
amount that the state earns in taxation from the share of PV which
originally accrued to the company. If however one also has a general
interest in the overall role of the modern state and if in particular
one wants to analyse the state's role as a productive accumulating unit,
the division of the state's share of PV earned from taxation as well as
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from the state's role as a capitalist enterprise also becomes important.
It should by now be clear that the direction of this investigation
is somewhat different from what is normal in traditional cashflow
analysis of the oil industry, and that this perspective brings forth
different categories of analysis. The tools of analysis outlined
will hopefully help us to understand in a more complete way the
genesis and history of the concept of participation. Finally, our
cashflow model can be of more general analytical value, for example,
by spelling out the consequences of different policies and trying to
understand what options at any one time were open to the Norwegian
policy-makers.
3.4 SLØY OF THE BASIC MODEL
Our next task is to describe in detail the model we will use to
determine the present value of hypothetical oil finds in the North Sea
and its division between the private companies and the Norwegian state.
In this chapter we only examine the variables that are necessary to
accomplish this task and point to their interrelationship. In
the following chapters, which deal with the historical development of
Norwegian policies, will we empirically establish the value of these
variables
The different participation scenarios negotiated in 1969 and later
are all superimposed on a 'basic' cashflow model which if necessary can
be run without any participation scenarios. This was the case in 1965
during the first round of allocation of acreage on the Norwegian
Continental Shelf when no participation agreements were negotiated.
Assessing a 'no participation' case in all post-1965 historic cases
also facilitates a comparison of the final outcome with what the outcome
would have been if no participation agreements had been negotiated.
We will now examine in detail each of the variables necessary to
find the Present Value of the field and the division of rent. Since
this model underlies all the subsequent case studies which are to
follow, considerable space will be devoted to an examination of its
basic assumptions. We will then outline how we tackle the problems of
government participation and problems like the introduction of the
Norwegian special tax.
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3.4.1 Price
The pric ,e in our model is chosen to equal the price of a barrell
of crude as realised in the Western European market. There is an
immediate problem with respect to such a price which was highlighted
in the Norwegian transfer - price confrontation of the 1960s
(see p,17), It is very doubtful whether the value of a
barrel of oil to a vertically integrated firm was best expressed by
the free -market price of oil given the small and unrepresentative nature
of the spot markets where such a price was determined .  35 Throughout
the 1960s and early 1970s, the spot market became the  ' dumping ground'
for excess crude from the majors .  Therefore ,  at least until 1972,
the price -used in our calculations can be said to be an understatement
of the true price of what the oil was worth to the companies .  Hence the
state's absolute share of rent would have been overstated as the present
value of the field was higher than our calculations suggest. Counter-
balancing this however is our treatment of transport costs. Because
we assume the use of pipelines ,  our chosen price refers to landed oil.
If the oil had to reshipped to other countries for further processing,
transport costs come in addition to the pipeline costs we have included.
On the other hand, if there were major refineries where .  oil was landed
the latter argument tends to lose its force .  This corresponds to the
situation after 1972 ,  when it was clear that at least oil from Ekofisk
would go to Teeside where Phillips owned a major refinery. But when
the Norwegian state could take out crude in lieu of royalties and also
started to gain direct access to participation - crude, the pricing
problem gradually became less important .  After 1974 it was however
replaced by the new problem of setting an appropriate  ' norm price'
whereby it was up to the Norwegian state itself to fix a  ' fair market
price' of oil.
The second variable which helps to determine total revenue is the
shape of the production profile .  Different production profiles will
matter little if we are only interested in undiscounted figures of
state and company  ' take ',  as long as total output is the same. But
our discounted figures are very sensitive to different production
profiles .  The faster a field is exploited ,  the better the discounted
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position for the company (if costs remain reasonably constant). While
there are technical limits as to what is the 'best' or 'optimum'
production profile of a field (for example a too rapid exploration may
bring about 'fingering', whereby part of the reserves are lost due to
water inflow in the field), there is also an element of choice as to
which profile to use. The choice of a profile may depend on the crude
needs of the specific company extracting oil and also reflect the
bargaining position of the companies compared with the state.
As our production profiles (see Table. 3), we have chosen
the ones used by Surrey (1976). They are based on figures submitted by
the companies for their intended (and actual) production profiles in
the UK sector of the North Sea, as of 1976, In addition, we have con-
structed a production profile broadly using the  same assumptions for a
hypothetical l billion barrel field (Table 3.2). The Surrey production figures
tend to have a longer production run and a lower peak output than
almost all the other comparable models. The 1 billion barrel example
for Statoil (1974) has a production that lasts for 18 years, while we
assume a production span of 26 years, while the Ministr of Finance
(1974)  assumes a  23-year profile for a similar field. The difference
becomes accentuated  when comparing our production profiles with the MIT
model , whose 700 mill, field has a lifespan of 14 years compared with
our 26 years and a much higher yearly maximum production which lasts
6 years, compared with our own maximum output which lasts 4 years. 36
We will nevertheless use the Surrey production figures throughout
the case study, given that they are based on actual production profiles
supplied by the industry. But by doing so it should be noted that the
expected present value of the field and the profitability will increase
if production is speeded up. So in order to properly  assess  our results
we have also run a sensitivity test for these using the MIT (1976)
production profiles. (This latter procedure was also undertaken to
counter the possible criticism that we have kept the production profile
fixed throughout the period.)
We assume  that revenues accrue from the field from the beginning
of the fourth year of investment. For a field with more than one plat-
form this is a reasonable assumption, as not all investments need to
be completed before making one platform able to produce. And even for
a one-platform field it can be assumed that production can take place
even if all production wells are not finished.
TABLE 3.1
E PRODUCTION FLOW SPECIFICATIONS *
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Year Field size
100M 200M 300M 400M 700M
First year of exploration 1 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0
First year of development, last of 4 0 0 0 0 0
exploration
5 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0
7 25 45 20 10 0
8 40 60 50 45 45
Last year of development costs 9 40 60 80 75 70
10 40 60 80 100 105
11 34 52 80 100 135
12 25 43 67 84 150
13 18 36 58 75 150
14 14 31 50 67 150
15 10 26 44 59 150
16 7 22 38 53 130
17 6 18 33 47 112
18 15 29 42 97
19 13 25 37 84
20 11 22 33 73
21 9 19 30 63
22 8 17 26 54
23 6 14 23 47
24 5 13 21 42
25 11 19 35
26 16 30
27 . 15 26
28 13 23
29 12 20
30 10 17
31 15
32 . 13
33 11
in thousands of
barrels per day
TABLE 3.2
!ATA ASSUMPTIONS RELATING TO THE BILLION BARREL. DISCOVERY
RODUCTION (thousands of barrels per day)
ear 1-7 8 9 10 11 12-16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Plow 0 30 60 105 160 225 202 169 142 119 100 84 71 59
Year 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
Flow 50 42 35 30 25 21 18 15 12 10
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COSTS
There are three cost categories in the extraction of oil:
exploration costs, development costs and operating costs.
3.4.3. Ex location costs
Exploration costs arise from geological and geophysical surveys,
and exploratory drilling .  Within the category of surveys ,  seismic
surveys constitute the bulk of the expenditure. This is the only cost
element that is cheaper offshore than on land . Offshore , charges of
dynamite or gas-pistols can be exploded directly in the sea without
the elaborate digging down of the charges that is necessary for onshore
surveys. The transport of the seismic registration apparatus is also
easier than on land. This gives an average cost of sea surveys equal
to one fourth of land surveys . 37 Magnetometric surveys are also
relatively cheap.38
The important cost in the exploration, phase originates in
exploration drilling .  The cost of each well sunk depends upon a
number of variables ,  the most important being distance from shore,
depth, weather conditions, depth of target formations ,  type of rock
above target and pressure of reservoir. The costs increase exponenti-
ally in relation to some of these variables. Normally the major
companies hire the services of drilling firms to carry out exploration
drilling. In our model we assume that total exploration costs stretch
over 4 years ,  with 10 %  of total costs incurring in the first year and
30% in the three following years .  This figure is the average figure
of the range given by Williams  ( 1972 ) ( 2-6 years ).  Other studies like
Ministr of Finance  ( 1974 )  disregard the exploration costs altogether
and simply state that such costs may come many years before other
costs. 39
The main problem is to decide how much exploration expenditure to
attribute to a hypothetical field. We choose to use the wildcat success
ratio of unexplored territories on a world - wide scale ,  and compute the
equivalent costs for finding one commercial find in the North Sea. If
the commercial success rate of new field wildcats in the mid 1960s (as
opposed to the percentage that finds traces of oil and gas) was one in
twenty, then total exploration costs would be twenty times the cost of
an exploration well. As the geology of an oil province gets better
99
and better known, this average should decrease .  On the other hand,
the most promising structures will first of all be drilled, thus
contributing to a decrease in the success rate in the long run.
3;4,4 Deyelo ment costs
Development cost can be divided into the following three broad
categories:
- delineation or appraisal wells
- production wells and platform costs, including installation
and equipment
- pipelines.
Once a successful wildcat has struck oil ,  a number of appraisal wells
have to be drilled to find the size of the field .  It is based on this
information that the decision is taken whether to go ahead with the
investment of platforms or not. The costs of appraisal wells can be
set equal to an exploration well. We can assume that four such wells
are on average necessary to determine the size of a field.40
The cost of development can then be computed based on the cost
of various installations needed to produce from a field. But development
costs for one field do not only depend upon the size of the field and
the depth of water where it is located .  There is also a technological
uncertainty attached to such a computation because it is not un-
ambiguously known how many production wells and production platforms
are needed  ( or are optimal) for a field only on the basis of information
on size and depth.41
But all general studies implicitly abstract from these difficulties
when they use 'average '  production costs for fields of a given size at
a given depth in order to carry out their cash flow analysis .  Following
e.g. estimates by Shell and Hinde , 42 we therefore assume that it is
methodologically legitimate to use an average figure for the number of
wells and platforms needed per unit of reserves .  Our model will utilize
the average figure used by Abbot and Crossman of 18 production wells per
platform and one platform per'100m .  barrels of recoverable reserves to
find development costs.43 It should however be stressed that while this
figure can be used as an average ,  it must only be regarded as a starting
point of a full analysis ,  given the discrepancies of conditions in the
North Sea. It is for this reason that throughout the case study we
have carried out sensitivity tests with respect to total development
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Production wells can be more expensive than exploration wells
because the angle at which they drill differs from the normal perpend-
icular. They will thus both be longer and will have to be drilled with
more accuracy than the normal exploration well. But because they will
be drilled from the fixed production platforms, no special rig has to
be hired. So their final cost is cheaper than the exploration wells even
if more production wells are likely to be drilled than actually will be used.
Some wells are also used to reinject gas and water into the reservoir.
We now turn to the most expensive item of the development costs:
the production platforms. Platforms in the North Sea have historically
been of two types, the concrete gravity structures pioneered by the
Norwegians and the more traditional steel platforms. The gravity
structures were not in use until the latter part of the period we are
examining. The main costs to take into consideration are the cost of
the structure itself, and its installation. (For example a flotation
collar necessary to deposit a steel jacket cannot normally be used
more than twice.) In addition we must include the necessary equipment
on the platforms. Of the smaller items we must account for land
installations (where the pipeline comes ashore), as well as costs to
cover administration, land purchase, financing costs. Finally we have
included a 'sundry' item. An overview of the distribution of these
different cost items, and their relationship to total development costs,
has been given by Cazenove 45 and Lovegrove.46 Using Lovegrove's
figures and disregarding the submarine pipeline and the platform wells
which we treat separately, we arrive at the following relative distri-
bution of the different components of platform cost: 47
Platform structure (including installation 71%
Equipment 18%
Sundry 11%
100%
We will on this background assume that if the cost of one of the three items of
platform costs is known, then the total platform costs can be computed.
Furthermore in line with the assumption made with respect to production
wells, we assume that the platform component of the development costs
shows constant returns to scale. 48
There are possible differences in the time distribution of total
investments. We assume that the investment is spread over 6 years with
a fixed percentage of total investment costs attributable to each year. 49
The distribution chosen is identical to the assumption of the MIT model
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(1976 ).  The number of years chosen for total investment costs (6) are
also identical to the number of years chosen by Williams  ( 1972), but 2
years less than Statoil  ( 1974).. But this latter discrepancy can at
least partly be explained by the fact that investment costs in the
Statoil model only includes exploration costs attributable to one field
and thus disregards unsuccessful exploration expenditure .  We also
assume that there is a one-year overlap between exploration costs and
investment costs .  This seems reasonable as it can be assumed that the
first delineation wells will be drilled in the same year as the last
of the exploration wells.
Finally ,  the costs of pipelines depend upon a number of variables
like the diameter ,  depth of water ,  and weather conditions in the area.
Pipeline costs will exhibit the classic textbook economies of scale,
only with respect to the actual naterial cost of the pipe, while the
cost of laying a pipe will be more or less the same whether the pipe
is 30" or 36 "  in diameter. .Because most pipelines are also constructed
with a fair amount of spare capacity ,  we will assume that total pipeline
costs remain constant no matter what quantity is produced from a field.
As the North Sea as an oil province grows older and a number of pipelines
will have been constructed ,  smaller new fields may be able to link up
with existing pipelines .  But during the period we have discussed
this was not expected to:,happen.
3.4.5 Economies of scale in develo ment
When all three components of development costs are taken into
consideration our hypothetical fields will exhibit economies of scale,
but on a decreasing scale. Pipeline costs are constant while total
platform costs show constant returns to scale. This is in line with
a number of statements made by representatives of the oil industry and
is also used by a number of other studies .  Surre y's development cost
figures can almost be derived by an identical procedure of assuming a
fixed cost and then adding a variable cost which shows constant returns
to scale.50 The common practice of. stipulating a fixed sum of
investment costs per daily barrel  ( of maximum production) from a
51
field also yields economies of scale on quite a substantial scale.
But this theoretical result has to be counterbalanced by the actual
technical conditions in the North Sea. According to Kennedy  ( Drilling
Editor of Oil and Gas Journal) there had been no economies of scale in
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the North Sea by the end of 1972, something he attributed to the fact
that "the very big fields have been encountered in the worst conditions".
This assessment  (but not with  the same reasoning ) was also echoed by
Shell in their submission to the Norwegian Parliament's Industrial
Ciommittee53 in 1975.
Given this background,,  it seems  that our assumption that there are
modest economies of scale in the North Sea is a reasonable one.
This category includes all non-capital or working expenditure that
is necessary to maintain the flow of oil from an oil-field. Direct costs
are labour, costs (including cost of supplies), power (both of the prod-
uction platform and the pipeline), transport and cost of separation of
oil from gas (if relevant). An often neglected but important  element
of total costs is insurance.54
We assume that operating costs are directly influenced by the
number of barrels. of crude being produced per time period, so we have
assigned a fixed sum per barrel as operating costs. This procedure
was first used by Hinde55 (who applied it to gas), but was also used
in the Gulf of Mexico Study by Weaver (1972) and by Cazenove.56 Some
studiesdivide the operating costs into a variable and a fixed amount.57
This is however.a questionable procedure to the extent that the cost of
insurance constitutes a major part of the fixed element of operating
costs; the reason being that the value of the platform, and consequently
the cost of insurance (which is roughly proportional to the value of
what is being insured) will decrease as the field is being emptied.
The above argument is only correct on the (reasonable) assumption that
the platform is not assumed to have any scrap value and therefore only
has a value in relation to the discounted value of future production
which will continuously fall as the field is emptied. Given this
background it is easily understood why there is no 'agreed' way of
treating operating costs. As late as 1975, Lovegrove58 characterised
operating costs as a 'grey' Area of analysis, something which is brought
out by wide discrepancies in the operating costs used by different
studies. Among other things the treatment of operating costs depends
upon whether we have a pipeline or a tanker-loading system. Our choice
of stipulating operating costs on a per barrel basis is  therefore a
compromise ,, which  also tends to underestimate  the profitability of the
companies. 59
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3.4.7 Debt conditions and taxes
We have now completed our summary of the cost and revenue factors
of the basic model which will remain unchanged throughout our case study
from 1965 to 1974. Total yearly revenues are based on a fixed production
profile which specifies output for each hypothetical field, and the price
of crude which can include an escalating factor. Total costs are the
sum of exploration ,  development and operating costs, also suitably
escalated over time.
But the total cashflow in each year is not only determined by
costs and revenues ,  but is also influenced by whether part of the costs
have been financed by loans. Appropriate assumptions can be included
in the model concerning the conditions for the repayment of loans (rate
of interest ,  number of years of 'grace ',  number of years of repayment,
when loans are taken up etc ).  Throughout he study we have assumed
that loans are raised as investment incurs (and not as a lump sum at
a specific time), and that interest is still levied during the 'grace
period' and added to the total debt ,  but that capital repayments do not
have to be repaid during the 'grace period '.  Repayments thereafter
take place as a fixed percentage of outstanding debts.
Once the expected present value is found, we can assess the total
share of this sum, which in one form or another accrues to the state.
The total share going to the state has two components ,  the tax share
and the participation share.
The tax share which arises from royalties ,  corporation tax and the
special tax depends upon the value of the taxation variables which change
from period to period, as well as on the percentage of the field which
is financed externally .  The latter is important because interest on
external debt can be deducted from taxable profits. Corporation tax
is computed after allowing for deduction of royalties, interest on
loans  ( if any ),  and depreciation according to a straight-line schedule.
All these tax assumptions have been included in the basic cashflow model.
The results from our basic model are presented in a computer print-
out which lists the pre- and post-tax present value of the oil-fields,
assessed at a discount rate of .  our choice ,  as well as the pre- and post-
tax internal rates of return .  Finally it gives the undiscounted value
of the state's 'take'. A number of simplifications have necessarily
been made in.order to arrive at these results .  But all the simplifica-
tions have tended to bias the results in the same direction, giving
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us a conservative model as regards the expected outcome or expected
present value of the field, the most important of which is our choice
of production profiles.
3.5 CHANGES IN THE 'BASIC MODEL' 1969
We will now outline how our model deals with the three kinds of
state participation agreements which were negotiated in 1969; here
labelled Scenarios 2, 3 and 4.60
3.5.1 Scenario 2' 61
An X per cent rate of participation gives the state X per cent of
total production ,  but also makes it liable for an equivalent percentage
of both exploration and development costs .  The state ' s share of explora-
tion costs is initially financed by the company ,  but is repaid out of
the state ' s production .  A rate of interest is charged on the state's
outstanding debt .  The state has to finance its own share of the
development costs.
3.5.2 Scenario 3 62
This participation scheme is very much like Scenario 2, except that
the company ,  in addition to financing exploration costs, also has to
carry the state ' s share of development costs. Repayment takes place
along the same lines as above.
Our computer program deals with these scenarios in the following
way. In both the above scenarios, the state ' s share of the exploration
costs attributable to the articular find is added up on a non - discounted
basis.  3  Interest is being charged on the outstanding debt once develop-
ment costs start to occur .  In Scenario 2 once development costs start
to occur, the state compares the net value of its share of the output
with the total amount it owes the company. As long as its debts are
greater than its net income, the state receives no oil, i.e. all oil
goes  to the company. 64
In Scenario 3 the same process takes place except that the
state's outstanding debt will be greater if the participation rate is
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the same ,  because the company will also finance the state's share of
development costs. But the principle for repayment will remain the
same. We have in both scenarios assumed that the value of the oil
which is due to the state is the net value, defined as gross value
minus the state ' s share of operating costs and royalties.65
If the rate of interest at which the state is supposed to repay
its outstanding debts is less than the discount rate, the concept of
participation will mean an immediate and direct financial loss to the
company and vice versa.66
Note also that when we talk about the 'cost' of participation to
the company we are talking in fairly restricted terms. The implicit
assumption that we face perfect capital markets makes the ability to
raise finance a 'non-problem ',  while if a private company has to act
as a bank and itself finance the state ' s share of exploration and/or
development costs, this may seriously preclude its own access to
outside finance.
3.5.3 Scenario 467
The final form of participation negotiated in 1969 was the 'net
profit '  agreement .  Within this scenario the state was to get a fixed
percentage of the companies '  profit, once their original investment
had been repaid out of production .  All appropriate calculations have
been done in undiscounted terms.68 This form of participation can be
said to have been the least threatening from the companies '  point of
view in terms of control over the production process. It could in
contrast with Scenarios 2 and 3 be presented as nothing but a financial
agreement.69
3.6 CHANGES IN THE  ' BASIC MODEL' 1972 AND AFTER
In both the 1972 and 1974 rounds the Norwegians asked for a new
kind of participation scheme ,  here labelled Scenario 1.
3-6-1 Scenario 1'70
The state pays no part whatsoever of exploration costs ,  which are
all paid by the company .  But the state pays its full share of development
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and operating costs as they arise. So if the degree of state
participation is X%, then according to our model the state will receive
X% of final output, while paying less than X% of total costs.
3.7 DIFFICULTIES
We are now going to investigate in more detail problems which arise
if we use discounted figures to determine the division of rent between
the state and the companies; difficulties,we must bear in mind when we
interpret our results.
Consider two different investment projects A and B in Figure 1
with after-tax (NPV) schedules of A' and B; (Figure 2.1). Project A
has both:!a higher IRR and NPV of the two. The discounted value at
discount rate r1 of the state's 'take' is xy, which in percentage
terms equals Xz. 100%. For Project B, the discounted value of the
tax-take zz' equals the pre-tax present value of the project, with a
corresponding percentage 'take' ofZX, . 100%. Clearly 'takes' is
greater than 'takeA'. This discussion also makes clear why we can get
a state 'take' of more than 100%. At discount rate r2, the state take
ca is greater than the original present value cb, which means that the
post-tax 'take' of the project at r2 will be greater than 100%.
The problem for an adequate interpretation of the results arises
if Project B corresponds to a field with a low profitability. Then
a high 'take' under such circumstances may simply reflect the lower
profitability and the lower PV and NPV of that project, compared with
the results from a field with a higher profitability (Project A), and
is unrelated to any other explanation like a high degree of state
'militancy'.
The reason for such an anomaly is to be found in the nature of
the taxation system. 'Due to the weight of royalties in the taxation
package, the drop in the PV as a result of taxation will never be
proportional to the pre-tax present value of the field (i.e. 'fine
tuning' in taxation is not ope)rational). As long as royalties are the
main element of the state's tax income at relatively low levels of
profitability, then with a given output total royalties will tend to
be a fixed sum independent of the PV of the project. Hence the differ-
ence in absolute size between xy and zz' may turn out to be relatively
insignificant, leading to the difficulties outlined above. (The
variable royalty rates introduced in 1972 would have rectified the
above anomaly only partially.)
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So while we maintain that the. discounted measurements for rents
are superior to the undiscounted, they also give rise to problems that
there are no simple and easy ways to solve.71
PV and NPV
AI
z
b
r
Figure 2.1
r2
3.8 THE MODEL: SUMMING UP
discount rate
The discussion about participation has one major consequence for
our procedure. In order to find the state's total access to the oil-
rent we must add all rent that Statoil will earn through its 'participa-
tion share' to the rent that the state will appropriate through taxation.
(Note that Statoil pays taxes like any other company.) Then, based on
the present value of the field, the discounted value of total taxes,
the discounted value of the participation share, and the net present
value if no participation had,been introduced, we can derive a number
of categories which we will use throughout our study.
(la) 'Total state take' = Statoii's Present Value (PV) + discounted
value of the state's tax income from the company share as a percentage
of the total PV of the field. This measures the state's total access
to the rent of a field either by tax or by participation. This total
state take can then be separated into taxation and equity shares.
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(2a) 'Taxation' share = discounted value of taxes levied on
Statoil  +  discounted value of state's tax income from the private
company as a percentage of the total PV of the field.
(3a) This taxation share can also be seen in percentage of total
state take  ( la above )  in which case it measures the weight of taxation
(as opposed to equity ownership )  in the state ' s access to rent.
(4a) 'Equity share ' =  discounted value of Statoil ' s net income
from equity in percentage of total PV of the field.
(5a) (4a )  can be seen as the percentage of total state take, in
which case it measures the weight of equity in the state ' s access to
rent .  In short it says something about the weight of  ' state capitalism'
within the Norwegian oil sector.
(6e) Finally we can find a discounted approximation to the
traditional concept of  ' state take ',  i.e. the present value of the
state ' s tax income from the private company ' s share divided by the PV
of the company's share. In this measure we single out the influence
of taxes on the company ' s share and thus disregard other influences
like participation.
Throughout we have assumed that the total PV of the field is the
sum of the PV of the Statoil and the PV of the company ' s share. This
sum differs slightly from the PV of the field  ' as if no participation'
due to the different debt structures of Statoil and the private
company. In order to facilitate a comparison with more conventional
calculations we can also derive an equivalent number of undiscounted
categories:
(ib) Total state take = Statoil's net cashflow  +  undiscounted
total taxes from the company ' s share as a percentage of the net cash-
flow of the field as a whole.
(2b) 'Taxation - share'  =  undiscounted value of all taxes levied
on both Statoil and the company as a percentage of the net cashflow
of the field as a whole.
(3b) As in  ( 3a), this tax-share can also be seen as a percentage
of the total state take  ( lb above).
(4b) 'Equity - share'  =  undiscounted value of the state ' s income
from Statoil ' s equity as a percentage of the net cashflow from the
field as a whole.
(5b) This equity share can again be seen as a percentage of the
total state take  ( see Sa).
I!
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(6b) The traditional  ' government take ',  i.e. the taxes collected
by the state from the company' s share as a percentage of the net cashflow
of the company ' s share.
Again all cases are assumed to be with debt ,  and the net cashflow
of the field the sum of Statoil ' s and the private company ' s cashflows.
Finally one general point needs to be made .  Our model helps us
to quantify not only the total amount of rent which accrues to the
state ,  but also the form in which the rent is appropriated by the
state. But a mere percentage figure  ( 4a), (5a ), ( 4b), (5b )  conceals
a number of problems which arise in relation to the introduction of a
large state sector. Parallel to our quantification of rent we therefore
continuously have to assess the magnitude of participation, how
effectively and how inde endently a state sector can pursue its own
aims.






















































































































































































































































































































































